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In very dynamic Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infras-
tructures, with rapidly growing applications, malicious intrusions have be-
come very sophisticated, effective, and fast. Industries have suffered bil-
lions of US dollars losses due only to malicious worm outbreaks. Sev-
eral calls have been issued by governments and industries to the research
community to propose innovative solutions that would help prevent ma-
licious breaches, especially with enterprise networks becoming more com-
plex, large, and volatile.
In this thesis we approach self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-
contained network programs (i.e. worms) as vulnerability mitigation mech-
anisms to eliminate threats to networks. These programs provide distinctive
features, including: Short distance communication with network nodes, in-
termittent network node vulnerability probing, and network topology dis-
covery. Such features become necessary, especially for networks with fre-
quent node association and disassociation, dynamically connected links,
and where hosts concurrently run multiple operating systems.
We propose – to the best of our knowledge – the first computer worm
that utilize the second layer of the OSI model (Data Link Layer) as its main
propagation medium. We name our defensive worm Seawave, a controlled
interactive, self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained vulnerabil-
ity mitigation mechanism. We develop, experiment, and evaluate Seawave
under different simulation environments that mimic to a large extent enter-
prise networks. We also propose a threat analysis model to help identify
v
weaknesses, strengths, and threats within and towards our vulnerability
mitigation mechanism, followed by a mathematical propagation model to
observe Seawave’s performance under large scale enterprise networks. We
also preliminary propose another vulnerability mitigation worm that uti-
lizes the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) for its propagation, along
with an evaluation of its performance.
In addition, we describe a preliminary taxonomy that rediscovers the re-
lationship between different types of self-replicating programs (i.e. viruses,
worms, and botnets) and redefines these programs based on their prop-
erties. The taxonomy provides a classification that can be easily applied
within the industry and the research community and paves the way for a
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In the world of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), net-
work applications are evolving rapidly and so are their threats. Malicious
worms and botnets have been identified as one of the most significant threats
facing the industry; indeed their outbreaks have cost the industry billions
of US dollars. Furthermore, it has been observed that the majority of ma-
licious worm outbreaks have utilized a publicly known vulnerability with
a vendor level patch already available. If security administrators were able
to identify and reach each vulnerable node in a rapid manner and mitigate
the vulnerability, then many malicious attacks would have been prevented.
Therefore, calls have been raised by industries and governments to search
for innovative solutions to respond to malicious worms attacks. For ex-
ample the chief of U.S. Department of Homeland Security have indicated
that ”The key thing we learnt from Stuxnet was the need for rapid response
across the private sector.” She also noted that recent malicious attacks have
reached a high level of sophistication and novelty [61].
Different difficulties prevent security administrators from providing im-
mediate treatment to each single vulnerable node in the enterprise network.
However – in general – these obstacles raise from the lack of ability to in-
stantly interact with each network device, due to some reasons, including:
• Dynamic nature of Internetworking. Enterprise networks are becom-
ing larger, complex, and volatile by nature. Where it is common for
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1. INTRODUCTION
subnets to emerge and disappear bound to business, technical, or ad-
ministrative demands, in an environment where network nodes asso-
ciate and disassociate dynamically. This makes it difficult for network
administrators to draw a detailed picture of their network to better
manage its risks and vulnerabilities.
• Transient Connectivity. In real world networks, links are not always
active. Connectivity is transient, based on how network links are im-
plemented or due to unforeseen failures making it difficult to deter-
mine current active network paths.
• Use of Virtual Machines that are Connected Intermittently. Many
nodes host multiple operating systems at different times (or at the
same time); which makes it difficult to determine which OS is currently
running for effective assessment.
• Lack of Resources. Traditional vulnerability assessment techniques
for large-scale networks require more resources and are not cost effec-
tive, which leaves many organizations (especially non-profit ones) fall
short in obtaining the required resources to provide efficient protective
measures to their networks.
The industry – up until now – has failed to provide efficient, reliable,
and rapid vulnerability mitigation mechanisms that give an instant, accu-
rate, and detailed vulnerability map of the enterprise network. Such a map
would provide the means for the security team to take action and inter-
act with target nodes to overcome potential threats promptly. We believe
that controlled, self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained net-
work programs (or defensive worms) can provide such functionality; since
– in some of its applications – defensive worms are not meant to be an ex-
ternal short term solution installed in the network to overcome an uncom-
mon problem, but rather an immune system, running within the network
24
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providing constant monitoring and continues protection. However, many
challenges face the consideration of worms as commercial solutions in the
ICT industry. To the best of our knowledge there is no solution in the indus-
try that adopts this technology, and in this thesis we try to overcome these
obstacles, by trying to answer the following research questions:
• Does utilizing the features of self-replicating, self-propagating, and
self-contained network programs (worms) provide rapid and effective
vulnerability mitigation coverage?
• Does utilizing topology information and communication between agents
aid in controlling the propagation of self-replicating, self-propagating,
and self-contained vulnerability mitigation network programs?
1.2 Summary of Contributions and Organization of the
Thesis
Our main contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of self-replicating,
self-propagating, and self-contained network programs (worms), include:
• We revisit self-replicating programs (viruses, worms, and botnets) def-
initions and propose new ones to include the defensive prospective.
We also propose design guidelines for defensive worms.
• We propose a novel controlled, topology-aware, interactive, self-replicating,
self-propagating, and self-contained network vulnerability mitigation
system (or vulnerability mitigation worm), that utilizes CAM and STP
information to propagate. To the best of our knowledge the system is




• Based on STP, CAM, ARP, and OSPF, we further enhance and improve
our defensive worm by adding edge node failure recovery, network
backbone traversal, and intermittent node detection and recovery.
• We propose another simple but novel vulnerability mitigation worm
that propagates with only knowledge of immediate network neigh-
borhood as can be obtained from passive observations of the LLDP
protocol.
• We observe and evaluate Seawave’s performance in response to a ma-
licious random scanning worm outbreak. We also discuss mechanisms
to protect Seawave against subversion and ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of its communications.
• We propose a threat analysis model based on Bayesian Belief Networks
to analyze and quantify threats towards our vulnerability mitigation
mechanism.
• We propose and analyze an analytical propagation model of our de-
fensive worm, to observe its performance in large-scale enterprise net-
works.
We hope our contributions joined by other’s work in that not yet well-
founded field of study, would help in building a foundation that paves the
way for this topic to become well researched in academia.
In the remaining of the thesis, we give in Chapter 2 an overview of defen-
sive worms where we redefine viruses, worms, and botnets, based on their
attributes and free from any prejudgments. Then, we further discuss de-
fensive worms by highlighting related work that covered the use of worms
for beneficial purposes in Chapter 3. We then introduce our vulnerability
mitigation worm (Seawave) in Chapter 4 and further improve it in Chap-
ter 5, followed by another vulnerability mitigation worm based on LLDP
in Chapter 6; before releasing Seawave to overcome a malicious random
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scanning worm in Chapter 7. We then propose a threat analysis model to
assess the risks towards Seawave in Chapter 8, followed by a mathematical
propagation model to evaluate Seawave in large-scale enterprise networks
in Chapter 9. Our summary, conclusions, and future work then follows in
Chapter 10.
1.3 Publications
The material of this thesis contains previously published papers, all with
my academic supervisor Dr. Stephen D. Wolthusen, as follows:
• Chapter 4 [4]
• Chapter 5 [5]
• Chapter 6 [3]
• Chapter 7 [6]
• Chapter 8 [8]




Defensive Worms – An Overview
2.1 Introduction
Several network interruptions, over the past few years, have been observed
as the result of malicious worms. Businesses that rely heavily on the In-
ternet have suffered serious financial losses, due to continuing Internet at-
tacks [22]. For example, malicious worms such as SQL Slammer, Code-Red,
and Conficker have cost the industry 1.2, 2.6, and 9.1 Billion of US dollars,
respectively [54, 66, 84]. The evolvement of botnets as a major source of
cybercrime (an industry worth more than 10 Billion of US dollars [34]) has
also added to the challenges; owing to the difficulty of allocating and dis-
infecting malicious bots [9, 62]. These have led the ICT industry to take
information security more seriously and start addressing innovative solu-
tions to help evade current network threats, especially with attacks becom-
ing more sophisticated, well targeted, and increasing in volume [60, 34] –
about one third of European Internet users reported a security incident in
2010 [36]. However, this is not a straightforward task, as in today’s net-
works the task of monitoring and managing assets has become more chal-
lenging; especially within more complex, large, and volatile enterprise net-
works. The challenges further increase when devices associate and disas-
sociate frequently, along with links connecting dynamically in a network
where hosts occasionally run multiple operating systems, leaving security
administrators in an often unpredictable environment.
It is worth noticing that most malicious worm hits have utilized vulner-
abilities that are publicly known, which indicates that the time-window be-
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tween the announcement of a vulnerability and its exploitation is too short
for effective patch deployment. Table 2.1 shows the interval between vul-
nerability announcement and worm appearance.
Name Vulnerability Announcement Worm Observed Interval– Days
Code Red 26 June, 2001 12 July, 2001 16
Slapper 30 July, 2002 14 Sept. 2002 45
SQL Slammer 24 July, 2002 25 January, 2003 185
Blaster 16 July, 2003 11 August, 2003 26
Zotob 9 August, 2005 16 August, 2005 7
Conficker.A 23 October, 2008 21 Nov. 2008 29
Conficker.B // 29 Dec. 2008 67
Conficker.B++ // 20 Feb 2009 120
Conficker.E // 7 April 2009 168
Stuxnet // (MS08-067) 17 June 2010 602
Table 2.1: The number of days between the announcement of a wormable vulnera-
bility (with a patch) and the worm appearance [11, 66, 63, 23, 71, 70] – Stuxnet has
used different vulnerabilities to propagate.
As it appears from table 2.1 worms such as Code Red, Blaster, and Con-
ficker.A took 16, 26, and 29 days respectively after vulnerability announce-
ment to breakout – not giving enough time for system administrators to
deploy patches. Perhaps, the delay in distributing updates might be ex-
plained by the quality of security-related configurations, but the question
of how efficient current mitigation mechanisms are in providing sound pro-
tection to enterprise networks remains. The ability to mitigate these vul-
nerabilities prior to worm outbreaks would save the industry billions of US
dollars. Yet – in the real world – effective, quick, and orderly patching that
ensures network systems are always up-to-date with the latest patches, is
hard to obtain. As in addition to the challenges addressed perviously, sys-
tem administrators need to test and examine patches before installing them
– to avoid inconsistency and service disruption – which delays patch de-
ployment. The time it takes for patch examination depends mostly on the
magnitude of the patches to be installed – sometimes organizations become
overwhelmed with the amount of patches they test [18]. Furthermore, usu-
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ally installing patches involves rebooting the system, leaving servers where
the service uptime is crucial vulnerable, until system administrators find a
way to tolerate service disruption [106]. Therefore, there exists a need for
vulnerability mitigation mechanisms that can tackle these problems and can
at least fill the gap between wormable vulnerability discovery and malicious
worm outbreaks.
HP Labs borrowed some worm techniques to distribute fixes within their
network; it helped them avoid the hit of the malicious worm Blaster, saving
them a large financial loss. ”Our countermeasure code took a very similar
approach to the actual Blaster worm,” said HP; however the payload trans-
ferred via TFTP to the infected machine was a ”remediation code.” There-
fore, before the outbreak of Blaster, ”HP had patched or disabled a huge
number of their [vulnerable] machines” [16]. However, HP chose not to use
worm propagation but rather distributed scanners or exploiters in a way
that mostly mimics worm’s behaviors. The company avoided using an ac-
tual worm as a precaution due to managerial fears that the worm might get
out of control, thus adding significant overhead and complexity to the im-
plementation of such an approach, as well as exposing the network to the
limitations of scanners1. Meanwhile, HP managed to circumvent the delay
usually associated with patch deployment by distributing temporary reme-
diations, where a formal patch is yet to be installed – when time permits.
They have also avoided violating the privacy law by exploiting their own
systems.
Defensive worms can be used to fill the gap between vulnerability expo-
sure and patching, in the same way as HP did. However, worms are hard to
monitor and control, and usually generate high amount of traffic that might
cause denial of service attacks and lead to network congestion – SQL Slam-
mer, for example, has consumed very high bandwidth that blocked Internet
access in South Korea [89]. But these problems are not insoluble; research in
1Scanners limitations are covered later in this chapter.
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this field can always improve our understanding of worms and give us the


















Figure 2.1: Proactive defensive worm incident response procedure.
For more effective vulnerability mitigation procedures, the ability to know
which vulnerability is wormable (i.e. has the potential to be utilized by a
worm) and how to temporarily remediate it becomes necessary – models
to evaluate how wormable is a vulnerability exist [73] as well as short-time
remediation techniques [106]. For example, a nonprofit international orga-
nization for vulnerability assessment can be formed to address these issues
and alert security administrators to take precautionary measures; and upon
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alert a defensive worm can be released to mitigate that vulnerability, be-
fore a malicious worm or an intruder exploit it. Based on HP’s threat man-
agement procedure [16], Fig. 2.1 shows a possible process of a wormable
vulnerability incident response.
Unfortunately, it can be noticed that the dominating opinion and the ini-
tial impression usually associated with worms have always been linked to
malicious intent [12]. Indeed, the observed malicious worm attacks in recent
years and the lack of comprehensive research on the beneficial side of these
network programs have contributed to that negative view. However, if we
released ourselves from any prejudgments regarding worms and tried to
view them as an information distribution technique that may provide some
distinctive features, that include [2]:
• Short distance communication with target nodes. Which speeds up
interactions, decreases the probability of link and host-to-host com-
munication failures, and keeps the bandwidth generated between the
worm and its target away from main network links.
• Intermittent node vulnerability detection. Enables the discovery of
offline hosts and portable devices (i.e. laptops, smart phones) once
they have been associated with the network.
• Network topology discovery2. Assesses in the discovery of undocu-
mented nodes, subnets, and other network devices that network ad-
ministrators might not be aware off.
• Intelligent Network Propagation. Enables the traversal of the net-
work according to security administrators preferences or task require-
ments.
2This feature becomes useful in detecting malicious botnets.
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• No single point of failure. The collection of agents form the scope of
the worm and the failure of an agent has minimum impact on the total
scope of work.
• Workload distribution. The impact of the workload is split between
the nodes within the scope of work.
Perhaps, then, we may be able to form a more comprehensive opinion on
this controversial topic of research.
2.2 A Taxonomy of Viruses, Worms, and Botnets
In general, to be able to consider the beneficial side of self-replicating pro-
grams and to easily classify them, it is necessary to observe this family of
programs from a different perspective and revisit their definitions to pave
the way for a research direction that would consider the defensive side of
self-replicating programs. When we observe self-replicating code based on
its properties, we might be able to obtain a less biased view of its nature. In
this section we revisit the common negative conception usually associated
with viruses, worms and botnets3 and observe how these programs relate
to each other providing a classification that can be easily applied within in-
dustry and the research community.
2.2.1 Malicious or Non-Malicious
Before we classify self-replicating programs we have to identify a common
ground without compromise, where it is possible to single out a program
as malicious or not. The term malicious is perceptional – one man’s misery
is another man’s joy. For example, Stuxnet has hit some nuclear facilities,
which might make it non-malicious (or beneficial) from the perspective of
those who oppose nuclear power, but at the same time malicious in the eyes
3Although we briefly cover and define viruses, the work through the thesis is based on worms.
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of those who support it. This ambiguity usually leads to frequent debates
in the industry or the research community. Therefore, it seems that law is a
reasonable referee to distinguish malicious acts to non-malicious ones. We
therefore leave the distinction between malicious and non-malicious self-
replicating programs – through this taxonomy – to the jurisdiction.
2.2.2 Viruses
Like worms viruses have always been portrayed as harmful and destruc-
tive, which has – in one way or another – impacted the way that they are
defined and proposed. Two definitions, for instance, include:
We define a computer ”virus” as a self-replicating program
that can ”infect” other programs by modifying them or their en-
vironment such that a call to an ”infected” program implies a call
to a possibly evolved, and in most cases, functionally similar copy
of the ”virus” [85].
A computer virus is a set of program instructions that attaches
itself to a file, reproduces itself, and spreads to other files[77].
As it appears from the first definition it uses the word infect (inferring de-
struction) which is a prejudgment, while the other considers attachment to
other programs behavior as a virus property. However, that might not be
the case, since the virus attaches itself to other programs as a hiding tech-
nique – assuming a malicious intent – and not necessary a virus attribute.
Even definitions that emphasize that a virus must be triggered by users [33]
(human intervention) for execution, are not specific, since that is the case
with most programs, not only viruses – even a worm in its first execution
instance is triggered by a user. Therefore, a more accurate definition of a
virus, would be:
Definition 2.1
A virus is a program that copies itself [90].
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Thus any self-replicating program is a virus; regardless of weather it at-
taches itself to files, or any other actions.
2.2.2.1 Malicious Viruses
With no regard to intention, when a virus behaves in a way that violates a
law issued by a legislative body, it can be considered malicious. Based on
Def. 2.1 and Section 2.2.1, we therefore define a malicious virus as:
Definition 2.2
A malicious virus is a self-replicating program that – when released – breaches the
laws issued by a legislative body.
Thus a virus that attaches itself to programs without user consent, exhaust
computing resources, or any other harmful tasks that would lead to convic-
tion before the court, would be considered as a malicious virus.
2.2.2.2 Benevolent Viruses
Bontchev discussed benevolent viruses in [14] and demonstrated the pos-
sibility of designing such programs. Although the author provided design
guidelines, he did not give an explicit definition that would otherwise help
identify benevolent viruses. Based on Def. 2.1 and Section 2.2.1 we therefore
define benevolent viruses as:
Definition 2.3
A benevolent virus is a controlled self-replicating program that – when released –
does not violate the laws issued by a legislative body.
Controlling virus propagation is essential, since it ensures that these self-
replicating programs do not perform beyond authorized borders.
2.2.3 Computer Worms
Worms are a subclass of viruses (i.e. advanced viruses), that inherit the
self-replicating property. Describing worms has been heavily debated and
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different definitions have been proposed in the literature [108]; however,
in general they go around two main properties [104]: Self-replication and
self-propagation using different communication mediums. Some of these
definitions include:
A worm is an independent program which, when run on a
computer, will attempt to infect other computer systems [...] In
this case the host program is the operating system of the com-
puter, and the infected code is a stand-alone process or thread of
execution running under the operating system [29].
[a computer worm is] an independently replicating and au-
tonomous infection agent capable of seeking out new host sys-
tems and infecting them via the network. [71]
A computer worm is a program that self propagates across a
network exploiting security or policy flaws in widely used ser-
vices. [107]
Yet there is a more formal definition of computer worms, that can be found
in R. T. Morris appeal (in 1991) which highlights the incident of releasing
what has been known as the Morris worm (released 1988) [91]. The court
defined a computer worm as:
In the colorful argot of computers, a worm is a program that
travels from one computer to another but does not attach itself to
the operating system of the computer it infects. [47]
but as Nazario mentioned, this definition does not cover some worms that
attach themselves to the operating system in order to hide their existence
by using root kits or any other techniques [71]. Furthermore, the court def-
inition along with some other definitions uses the word infect to describe
the activity of injecting the worm’s payload into the system – inferring a
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malicious intent – which make these phrases more appropriate to define
malicious worms rather than worms in general. Following the existence of
the area of defensive worms, using these words may no longer be adequate
in worm definitions, since the injected payload might be for beneficial or
non explicit malicious purposes (such as vaccination). Therefore, for the
purpose of this thesis, a computer worm is defined as:
Definition 2.4
A computer worm is a self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained pro-
gram that uses networking mechanisms to spread itself [81].
2.2.3.1 Malicious Computer Worms
Malicious worms – when released – breaches the laws issued by a legislative
body. Even if these types of worms were released for good intentions, did
not damage vulnerable systems or their networks; violating users privacy is
enough to make these programs fall into the malicious category. Based on
Def. 2.4 and Section 2.2.1 we define Malicious worms as:
Definition 2.5
A malicious computer worm is a self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained
network program that – when released – breaches the laws issued by a legislative
body.
Often malicious worms carry either a malicious payload or a payload
without an explicit destructive intention in it, such as Slammer [63]. How-
ever, in general, such worms would not inject a beneficial payload into their
targets. Damaging a network has been a common characteristic of malicious
worms. Furthermore, malicious worms often propagate virally; as soon as
they outbreak it is hard to stop or eliminate them. The faster and more viral
the worm propagation is, the greater the impact and damage to the network.
Examples of malicious worms include: Morris [91], Witty [65], Code red II
[66], Blaster [11], and SQL Slammer [63].
38
2.2 A TAXONOMY OF VIRUSES, WORMS, AND BOTNETS
2.2.3.2 Defensive Computer Worms
The research literature of defensive worms can not be described as mature.
Researchers refer to these types of worms using different terms, including:
Beneficial worms, benign worms, good worms, benevolent worms, anti-worms,
epidemic-style information dissemination, white worms, killer-worms, nematodes,
helpful worms, good will mobile code, friendly worms, civilian worms, predators,
counter-worms, or defensive worms. Despite the term used, researchers agree
that the main purpose of these worms is beneficial to the network. David
Aitel defines a defensive worm as:
A controlled worm that can be used for beneficial purposes
[2].
It is worth mentioning that some researchers did not require a defensive
worm to be controlled, yet it should have a beneficial payload [18]. How-
ever, previous implementations of worms with a beneficial use proved that
uncontrolled (or viral) propagation might cause unexpected damage to the
network. To avoid viral propagation, a main feature of defensive worms is
the ability to control the way they propagate. Controlling worms, unfor-
tunately, is a vague area in information security with little literature pub-
lished except some techniques such as a query and response mechanism,
something similar to DNS, which gives a green light for a defensive worm
to target [2] or setting a time to live (or age) for the defensive worm. Other
approaches might be utilizing topology information such as the Link Layer
Discovery Protocol (LLDP), Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table, or
Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) to define the path where these worms should
travel [3, 4]. Based on Def. 2.4 and Section 2.2.1 we define defensive worms
as:
Definition 2.6
A defensive computer worm is a controlled self-replicating, self-propagating, and
self-contained network program that – when released – does not violate the laws
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issued by a legislative body.
From this definition, the worm can also be used for non security purposes,
such as network topology mapping, traffic analysis, allocating undocumented
nodes, and many other administrative tasks. However, in this thesis we con-
sider the vulnerability mitigation side of this approach.
2.2.4 Botnets
Botnets are an extension of the worm class (i.e. advanced worms) where
agents can interact with each other. In other words botnets inherit the prop-
erties of worms and add an interaction property. In the context of self-
replicating code, we define botnets as:
Definition 2.7
A botnet is an interactive self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained net-
work program.
Based on this definition when worm agents (or bots) have the capability to
interact with each other, such a worm can also be described as a botnet. This
description becomes necessary to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity when
discussing worms and botnets. For example Conficker can be described
either as a worm or to be more precise as a botnet (advanced worm), both
descriptions can explain the program.
2.2.4.1 Malicious Botnets
As with malicious worms and viruses we define in a similar way a malicious
botnet as:
Definition 2.8
A malicious botnet is an interactive self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-
contained network program that – when released – breach the laws issued by a
legislative body.
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Examples of malicious botnets include: Storm [82], Conficker [23], and Stuxnet
[70].
2.2.4.2 Defensive Botnets
As in defensive viruses and worms, defensive advanced worms (or botnets)
should be controlled. We define defensive botnets as:
Definition 2.9
A controlled, interactive, self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained net-







Interactive, Self-Replicating, and Self-Propagating
Figure 2.2: Self-replicating Programs Classification.
2.3 Taxonomy in Practice
Based on this classification, viruses act as a superclass in which its attributes
are inherited by worms [97], likewise botnets evolve to become a subclass of
worms, see Fig. 2.2 for an illustration. This hierarchal view reflects the rela-
tionship between self-replicating programs and is a more constructive way
to approach viruses, worms, and botnets. Which would help clear the con-
fusion that sometimes takes place when researchers comment on incidents
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that involve self-replicating programs. It will also pave the way for consid-
ering the beneficial side of these programs. Table 2.2 lists self-replicating
programs and classify them based on their properties.
+ Virus Advanced VirusßWorm Advanced Wormß Botnet
Program Name (Self-Replicating) (Self-Propagating) (Interactive)
Bolzano 4 6 6
Chiton 4 6 6
Perenast 4 6 6
Code Red I & II 4 4 6
SQL Slammer 4 4 6
Blaster 4 4 6
Slapper 4 4 4
Conficker 4 4 4
Stuxnet 4 4 4
Seawave 4 4 4
Table 2.2: Virus, Worm, or Botnet?
2.4 General Attributes of Defensive Worms
There is a subtle distinction between a malicious worm and a defensive one;
to avoid designing defensive worms that might engage in malicious activ-
ity, the industry needs some guidelines or a standard to ensure the quality
of these solutions. It is not the payload that differentiates defensive from
malicious, because worms with beneficial payload might still cause harm to
the network [17]. Welchia, for instance, has been used as a countermeasure
to the worm Blaster; it injected a beneficial payload, which downloaded
a remediation patch from a central server. The problem was that Welchia
overwhelmed the network with high bandwidth load, leading to high net-
work disturbance [18] and flagging the worm as malicious – more details
on Welchia is given later in Section 3.2. Also, while a beneficial payload dis-
tributed by a viral propagation technique is malicious, in the same way, a
controlled propagation mechanism along with a malicious payload is ma-
licious as well. Therefore, by combining the two factors, which are a non-
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malicious payload along with a controlled propagation technique, we might
be able to see some difference between the two types of worms. Yet, that is
not enough, a worm which is controlled and carries non-malicious payload,
might still penetrate into unauthorized systems and thus should be treated
as malicious. Therefore – inspired by Bontchev [14] – some design aspects
can be considered before producing a defensive worm:
Payload The payload designed to be carried by the defensive worm should
not be engaged in any malicious activity and should not exhaust com-
puting resources.
Propagation The propagation of the defensive worm must be controlled
to ensure that it stays within the scope of work and does not exhaust
network resources.
Transparent The defensive worm should be easily recognized and perceived.
Uninstall The defensive worm should have the functionality to be com-
pletely removed or uninstalled.
Legal The defensive worm should not be designed to violate the laws is-
sued by a legislative body.
Considering all these aspects before releasing a worm, would aid in deploy-
ing productive defensive worms. Still, it is a controversial area of discus-
sion, arguments do exist between information security specialist regarding
defensive worms. However, in general, a defensive worm should produce
some degree of remediation and should not cause any harm to networks or
violate any policies that it should, otherwise, adhere to.
2.5 Defensive Worms vs. Vulnerability Scanners
Defensive worms outperform traditional vulnerability scanners at least in
three main aspects: Probing distance, ability to detect intermittent nodes
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and traversing the network regardless of network architecture. A shorter
communication distance between a vulnerable node and the probing server
is faster and less exposed to link failures compared to communicating to a
remote IP address. Defensive worms install agents along their propagation
path which hire each node to participate in the scanning activity and still
maintain high scanning coverage even when an agent fails (i.e. no single
point of failure). Scanners, however, scan different IP addresses remotely,
thus adding more distance and more time for the scanners to communi-
cate with their targets, and upon scanning server failure, the whole scope
of vulnerable nodes is exposed. Furthermore, defensive worms keep prob-
ing their targets for vulnerabilities and detect any newly joining nodes or
off-line nodes that become on-line. Yet, when vulnerability scanners con-
clude their assessment, newly joining or previously off-line nodes become
exposed. Also, the self-discovering nature of defensive worms gives them
the ability to spread around complex and large networks without high re-
gard to the network architecture. Yet, scanners are usually required to be
installed at each network segment for better performance [2].
2.6 Defensive Worms – Different Views
In this controversial topic, using worms for beneficial tasks often raise dif-
ferent views, some of which are hereby addressed.
2.6.1 Worms are not authorized to penetrate into their targets.
Worms can access network nodes using different techniques, not necessarily
penetration. A worm can request permission from a user to access the sys-
tem, use an assigned account, exploit a vulnerability, or other approaches.
Releasing a worm should be within authorized scope (such as an enterprise
network), should this not be the case, the worm becomes illegal as in any
other solution.
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2.6.2 Worms exhaust network bandwidth and hard to control and target.
Exhausting network bandwidth might be a common criteria of malicious
worms, but is not a property of worms in general, and can be tackled by
proposing new propagation algorithms which ensures that the worm tra-
verses the network without disruption. It is the duty of the research com-
munity to design efficient controlling and targeting algorithms to further re-
duce the risks usually associated with self-replicating and self-propagating
mechanisms – things appear hard until we become more aware of them.
2.6.3 Defensive worms do not stop zero-day attacks.
Defensive Worms are a tool to be used by security experts to prevent ma-
licious attacks; tackling zero-day attacks is a design issue and depends on
how worms are deployed – i.e. a behavioral based solution could detect a
zero-day attack and releases a defensive worm to stop it.
2.6.4 Worms might leave a machine unstable and users might transfer
the worm to other networks using their portable computing
devices.
Like any solution, worms are tested before deployment to ensure they meet
project goals. Controls can be proposed to prevent worm dissemination out
of authorized scope, e.g. an agent does not propagate without a green light
from a central node.
2.6.5 The risk when something goes wrong during worm operation is
much higher than any other program.
This is a good reason to further research into worms and further understand
them to minimize their potential risks. Like an airplane it is too risky if
something goes wrong, but with comprehensive research, traveling now by
airplanes is one of the safest ways of commuting.
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2.6.6 When you add all necessary precautions, worms become so
complex, that a patch management system would be enough.
Worms are not a replacement for patch management systems, they are tools
that provide different features that can be utilized for different tasks. Worms
are naturally simple as their self-exploring nature and ability to learn ease
the need for detailed configurations.
2.6.7 Worms would propagate to non-enterprise nodes, such as plugged
visitors portable devices.
Visitor’s devices should not access enterprise networks without authoriza-
tion to ensure these devices do not host malicious code that might emigrate
to the network. During the authorization process, devises can be excluded
from the worm’s scope (i.e. by IP or MAC). In general, giving non-enterprise
devices full access to the network can not be considered a good practice. If
we assume that a visitor node accesses the network without authorization,
then since worms can access nodes using different techniques not neces-
sary by exploitation such as by using an assigned domain account, then an
access failure is expected when the defensive worm tries to access a visitor
device. Upon access failure, network device information and location can
be reported to the security team for action. These are design issues and is
left for the security team to configure the worm according to its assigned
mission.
2.6.8 There is no industrial need.
With current network threats, the industry and the government have gath-
ered their efforts and issued calls for innovative solutions to keep consumer’s
ICT infrastructures protected from emerging and developing threats [61,
34]. Also, developing products that satisfy current industrial requirements
is not a necessity for the research community; indeed very noticeable in-
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ventions – like airplanes, Global Positioning System, electronic computer,
or Internet – have not initially evolved based on – at the time – market de-
mands [41].
2.7 Wormophobia
Many researchers associate worms with malicious intent; indeed many ob-
served worm outbreaks have caused great damage to the industry. This
created a prejudgment that worms are always prejudicial to the network.
This led industries to fear the use of self-propagating and self-replicating
mechanisms as solutions to security or administrative problems. However,
this fear factor [2, 45] can be eliminated or reduced to a level that would
make defensive worms more acceptable commercially. Bellamy et al. inves-
tigated the reasons behind the fear of worms (Wormophobia) by conducting
a survey to derive people’s opinions and suggest steps to help escape from
this fear circle [12]. They have selected a group of students of mixed age,
level of education, and IT knowledge to ask them several questions with
visual aids; examples of which are shown in Fig. 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
Figure 2.3: ”Would you allow a worm to run on your system if it stated its purpose
and displayed contact information of who commissioned it?” [12]
47
2. DEFENSIVE WORMS – AN OVERVIEW
Figure 2.4: ”Would you allow a worm to run on your system if you had the ability
to disable it once it had entered your system?” [12]
Figure 2.5: ”Would you allow a worm to run on your system if the worm had third
party verification?” [12]
This study noticed that using visual aids, in addition to revealing more
information about the mission of the worm (transparency) would help raise
the level of acceptance towards defensive worms. The study also indicated
that using the term worm in commercial use would make the user suspi-
cious and uncomfortable and suggested using different terms to sell such
products to wider customers.
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Chapter 3
Defensive Worms – Related Work
3.1 Overview
Following the overview of defensive worms in Chapter 2; in this chapter
we cover previous work that approached computer worms as a solution to
network problems or as a defensive mechanism. Since the topic of defen-
sive self-replicating and self-propagating network programs did not reach
a reasonable level of maturity, up until now, we therefore cover researchers
attempts from diverse resources.
3.2 Related Work
We divide this section into three subsections, with the first being an overview
of research that adopts the use of worms for beneficial purposes. The second
part highlights attempts carried out to release potential defensive worms;
and the last focuses on general worm propagation techniques.
3.2.1 Defensive Worms in Literature
In the first research that used the term worm; the self-replicating and self-
propagating network program was released for beneficial purposes. In 1979
Shoch and Hupp of Xerox Palo Alto Research Center deployed a worm that
offered distributed computation within a network. The worm searches for
idle machines and utilizes their free processor cycles to compute tasks; it
allocates its targets by incrementing local host numbers. The worm does
not exploit any vulnerabilities to gain access to an idle machine, but would
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rather request the machine to follow a certain procedure to transfer the
worm. However, one morning, the worm went out of control and resulted
in 100 machines malfunctioning. Fortunately, the authors included an emer-
gency exit – when things go wrong – that enabled them to stop the worm.
The control algorithm was later improved and another program was in-
cluded to monitor, log, and control the size of the worm, leading the worm
to run ”flawlessly.” Different applications were implemented including [87]:
• The Existential Worm: Used mainly to test the mechanism, doing noth-
ing on the machine, but it could display a simple message and had the
ability to self-destruct (or expire) after a randomly selected time.
• The Billboard Worm: Was used to display an image on the user’s screen;
the image is either included in the worm or is fetched from a central
server.
• The Alarm Clock Worm: Uses an independent user program to allocate
the worm and request a call to the user’s phone. Like a wake up call
calendar, the worm maintains a database of user’s requests. When the
time of the call is up, it connects to a terminal and calls the user.
• Multimachine Animation Using a Worm: A graphical engine that spans
several machines and is controlled by a master node. Machines work
in parallel on graphical frames before sending them back to the mas-
ter node upon request. This application might be the first documented
computer botnet – in the context of self-replication and self-propagating
network programs.
• A Diagnostic Worm for the Ethernet: The worms here perform diag-
nostic operations, that require communication among machines and
report results to the master node.
However, the experiment can be improved by utilizing topology infor-
mation to control the worm propagation and enhance bandwidth utiliza-
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tion. It is not known how the proposed worms operate within large scale
networks and if they can be easily recognized and perceived by users and
network administrators. These worms also miss protective measures that
ensures the confidentiality and integrity of its communications.
In the same direction, Toyoizumi et al. proposed a propagation model
based on Lotka-Volterra (or predator prey) equations for a defensive worm
that counters a malicious one. The defensive worm propagates by tracing
the malicious one (e.g. by sniffing its traffic). When an infected node is
detected by the defensive worm it penetrates the infected machine using
the same attack vector as the malicious one and immunizes the system be-
fore propagating to a random number of randomly selected hosts, using
the same method as the original malicious worm. Simulations with differ-
ent scanning rates were performed on this model with their results being
evaluated [102]. However, it is not advisable to use random scanning tech-
niques, as it is hard to keep a worm using such propagation method op-
erating within limits, let alone the excessive bandwidth generation usually
associated with viral propagation techniques.
Wang et al. proposed a worm taxonomy to cover the aspect of worms
used for beneficial purposes. They introduced a definition of a defensive
worm which they have divided into two other worm types:
• SFworm: A defensive worm that penetrates into a susceptible machine
using the same technique as the malicious one. It patches the vulnera-
ble host to protect it from future infections.
• IFworm: A defensive worm that removes a malicious one and patches
the infected system to prevent any potential breaches. It enters the
infected machine using a backdoor installed by the malicious worm.
They have also proposed mathematical propagation models of these worms
and simulated and analyzed them under different scenarios to counter ma-
licious ones [104]. They used random scanning to locate targets and intro-
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duced a propagation technique that divides a scanning space into N sub-
spaces, where the worm self-replicate to each subspace and so on until the
worm kills itself when the scanning space becomes null. However, for more
practical relevance, their proposal can be strengthened by providing techni-
cal details on how the worm divide the scanning space. The authors also do
not highlight if the worm is authorized to penetrate into susceptible nodes,
or provide any protective measure that prevents the worm from being hi-
jacked by adversaries.
Similarly, Nicole et al. tried to measure the effectiveness of defensive
worms by proposing four defense measures to counter malicious worms.
These defensive types include:
• Simple patch. In this type, when a fixed number of nodes, scan (ran-
domly) a susceptible node, it becomes patched.
• Spreading patch worm. Though similar to the Simple patch technique,
this type of worm not only patches the susceptible node but also self-
replicates before it starts scanning. Unlike the Simple patch, the patch-
ing hosts here continuously grow.
• Nullifying defense worm. In this technique, when the counter-worm
scans an infected host it becomes suppressed, that is, the infection traf-
fic is no longer effective.
• Sniper worm. In this technique, the counter-worm in the host listens for
infection scans and upon detection it scans back the source of the in-
fection (assuming the source IP address is not spoofed) and suppresses
it.
Using discrete and continuos models, the authors evaluate these techniques
as an active defense mechanism against malicious Internet worms [74]. In
another work they also extended the Nullifying worm model to allow the
worm to penetrate the infectious node, remove the infection, and self-propagate.
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They have also compared some of these active techniques against passive
measures, such as content filtering and address blacklisting [55]. However,
as stated previously, using random scanning is not advisable; controlling
the propagation of the worm either by utilizing topology information or
any other factor, might be necessary to prevent the defensive worm from
operating beyond limits or generating unnecessary bandwidth. Further en-
hancement would be providing protective controls to maintain the integrity
and confidentiality of the defensive worm, in addition to, clarifying how the
worm can be uninstalled from the network.
In addition, Castaneda et al. used defensive worms to counter malicious
ones upon their outbreak into the network. Their active mechanism trans-
forms a malicious worm into an anti-worm to provide immunization to in-
fected or susceptible nodes. Through simulations they have evaluated their
method against malicious worms such as CodeRed I, MSBlaster, and SQL
Slammer. Their framework encompasses three stages: Detection, Analy-
sis, and Generation. Upon detection the mechanism analyzes the malicious
worm to detect which application is vulnerable and observes the changes
occurred on the system before generating an anti-worm. The anti-wrom
uses the same attack vector, to counter the malicious one. To spread the
immunization payload, the mechanism uses four propagation approaches
[18]:
• Passive Anti-Worm. In this technique the anti-worm listens for mali-
cious scans and responds to the origin – disinfecting the source node.
• Active Scanning Anti-Worm. The anti-worm here uses random scanning
to allocate its targets.
• Active-Passive Hybrid Anti-Worm. In this technique the anti-worm starts
with random scanning before switching to passive propagation.
• IDS-based Anti-Worm. The anti-worm in this technique detects its tar-
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gets based on intrusion detection devices scattered around the Inter-
net. These devices capture suspected traffic and identify its source and
destination for immunization.
However, this method can be improved by adding controls to prevent
adversaries from abusing it, while making the defensive worm easily per-
ceived and observed in the network for any monitoring or troubleshooting
activity. The method also lacks a switching off technique or an uninstalling
procedure.
Peikari, also investigated the possibility of using defensive worms to
counter malicious ones. The author suggested different properties of an
effective defensive worm, including:
• Providing a lasting immunity against the targeted infection.
• Consuming less resources than the targeted malicious worm.
• Distributing easily within the network.
• Should adhere to quality control procedures and eliminate its side ef-
fects as much as possible.
• The cost of developing a defensive worm should not be expensive for
the organization and must reduce the potential damage caused by the
malicious worm.
Different real world – event driven – simulations were conducted to test
the defensive worm – using a nonhierarchical network topology. The sim-
ulations experienced a CodeRed outbreak and a defensive worm that uses
CodeRed’s propagation technique, however, to patch – rather than to infect
– susceptible nodes. The defensive worm assumes the properties mentioned
previously and is released before and after the malicious worm outbreaks,
where an evaluation under different scenarios is conducted [24]. However,
the legal aspect of defensive worms should always be highlighted and —
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as noted earlier – adopting viral propagation techniques is too risky for the
network. It is also not clear how to switch the defensive worm off or what
protective measures are applied to ensure the integrity and the confidential-
ity of its communications.
For wireless sensor networks, Khayam et al. introduced and evaluated a
Topology-Aware Worm Propagation Model to help in defending malicious
worms and provide an effective vehicle to disseminate necessary informa-
tion to secure the network. They divide the sensor network into rectangular
segments (positions), where sensors (nodes) are uniformly distributed. A
node in each segment can – at minimum – communicate with nodes inside
the segment. For those nodes located at segment corners, the communi-
cation can expand to neighboring segments of up to r transmission me-
ters. Each infected node self propagates to β fraction of its neighbors. In
their model they have considered physical, MAC, network, and transport
layer parameters [51]. However, it is necessary to address the legal aspects
of releasing defensive worms in wireless networks and provide a method
to uninstall and completely remove the worm from the network – in case
worm deployment went out of plan.
Industry wise, Dave Aitel implemented a framework that can create a
defensive worm (or a Nematode) that propagates based on simple incre-
mental scanning. The automatically generating defensive worms frame-
work converts an exploit into a payload to be used by the worm. This is
probably the first attempt from industry to consider worms for beneficial
purposes. However, no further development or marketing attempts about
the framework have been observed [2].
Based on [102], Gupta et al. proposed three propagation models of de-
fensive worms as follows:
• Persistent predators; which adds a delay before the defensive worm
dies.
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• Immunizing predators; which access vulnerable systems disinfect and
install patches.
• Seeking predators; which has the ability to follow the propagation path
of the malicious worm.
They have run different simulations on a non-hierarchal fully connected net-
work testing their propagation techniques to counter malicious worms fol-
lowed by results analysis and evaluation. They have also addressed some
central patching drawbacks, such as the possibility of bottlenecks occurring
during patch distribution in large scale networks and the vulnerability of
denial of service attacks usually associated with server-centric approaches.
They also suggested few methods to access a user machine without exploita-
tion and indicated that based on their experiments, defensive worms can be
a promising alternative for centralized patching [35]. However, the pro-
posed worm propagates randomly making it hard to control and there is
no suggested controls to protect the defensive worm from malicious users.
Further improvement can also be making the worm easily perceived and
observed in the network for better monitoring and troubleshooting.
In the same direction, Wu et al. adopted the approach of containing a
malicious worm by releasing a defensive one; they have divided defensive
worms into three types [109]:
• Patching, which only installs a patch on vulnerable nodes.
• Predator, which removes the malicious worm from infected hosts (with
the ability to install a patch).
• Composition, which removes the malicious worm from infected nodes
and patch the vulnerable system.
The approach can be enhanced by using topology information to control
the way these worms propagate and adding protective measures to prevent
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any misuse of the defensive worm. The approach also lacks a safe exit in
case things went wrong or a clear uninstalling procedure.
In another strategy, Liu et al. proposed an epidemic model of a defen-
sive worm that spreads within a directed graph such as there is no repeated
edges and the in degree of each node is one while the out degree of each
node is the same. In their Balanced Tree based Propagation strategy model,
the worm infects the node, then moves forward to its descendants before
deleting itself on the infectious node. Using Matlab they have run different
simulations of defensive vs. malicious random scanning worm followed
by a performance evaluation of their strategy [56]. However, for practical
relevance, the authors should provide technical details on how the worm
define its propagation path. Further improvements can be adding measures
to protect the worm’s line of communication from malicious abuse and pro-
viding a technique to remove or uninstall it, in addition to, addressing the
legal background behind releasing the worm.
Meanwhile, Tanachaiwiwat et. al studied the defensive worm vs mali-
cious worm technique and identified three types of worm interactions:
• One-Sided. One worm counters another worm in a way that mimics the
predator/prey technique.
• Two-Sided. Two worms try to finish each other. Predator against an-
other predator type of interaction.
• Indirect. Two worms exist in the same network without trying to over-
come each other.
They model these interactions and evaluate their performance through sim-
ulations taking into consideration two factors: Scan rate ratio and initial in-
fected host ratio [98]. They also extend their work by proposing a model of
an aggressive one-sided interaction considering network delay factors such
as packet size, latency, queuing algorithm, and bandwidth. They also pro-
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vide a metric to measure the damage caused to the network by the malicious
worm after the release of a defensive one, in addition to identifying some
factors that affect malicious worm containment procedure [99]. On the same
path as Castaneda et al. the same authors proposed a model of a defensive
worm encountering a malicious one (aggressive one-sided worm interac-
tions), however, under an encounter-based network which is a ”frequently-
disconnected wireless ad-hoc networks requiring close proximity of neigh-
bors.” In their work they concentrated on mobile node characteristics such
as cooperation between nodes, immunization, and intermitted node behav-
ior [100]. However, it is not clear in which legal ground the authors expect
the worms to be released and weather the worms are easily perceived and
observed in the network. The work can be further extended by considering
controlled worm propagation techniques and securing the mechanism from
possible adversaries misuse.
Based on the two-factor model [116] Zhou et al. put forward a mathemat-
ical propagation model of a passive worm and analyzed the possibility of
using passive worms for defensive purposes. They also identified the initial
value of passive worms, the scanning rate, the removal rate, and time de-
lays as factors that affect the performance of these worms [115]. Following
the classification of worms in [18] and the classification proposed in [109]
the authors further classify Hybrid defensive worms into three types:
• Patching-hybrid defensive worm: The defensive worm combines the
attributes of both a Patching and a passive defensive worms.
• Predator-hybrid defensive worm: The defensive worm combines the
attributes of both a Predator and Passive defensive worms.
• Compositive-hybrid defensive worm: The defensive worm combines
the attributes of both a Compositive and Passive defensive worms.
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They derive models of each type taking into consideration time delays and
run simulations and evaluate their performances [114]. The work, however,
disregards the legal issues regarding releasing such defensive worms and
does not provide an uninstalling or removing method after worm deploy-
ment. The work can be further improved by considering controlled propa-
gation techniques and adding controls to ensure the defensive worm is not
utilized by malicious users.
Different theoretical epidemic-style probing strategies were proposed by
Vojnovic´ et al. based on random probing. They identify the minimum num-
ber of probes required to reach targeted number of nodes, assuming the
distribution of susceptible nodes among the network is known. They used
a variable probing rate that changes based on time (dynamic strategy) or a
fixed probing rate (static strategy) in an attempt to recognize the most suit-
able performance to disseminate information using random probing. For
dissemination where host distribution is not known, each infected host ini-
tiates probing based on information received from the original infecting
node. In this strategy, the worm switches between local subnet probing
and global address space random probing, based on an observed number
of failed probing attempts (K-Fail). Another probing strategy picks a host
randomly from within a randomly selected subnet in a list stored in the
infectious host, or picks a host randomly from the entire address space (K-
CANDSET). They also evaluate the parameters that affects the performance
of their proposed strategies based on different Internet datasets [103]. How-
ever, the work does not provide technical details on how these propaga-
tion techniques can be implemented which is necessary for any practical
relevance. Also it is necessary to address the legal issues regarding self-
replicating propagation techniques and how these techniques can be pro-
tected from malicious abuse.
From a human rights perspective, Aycock tried to consider defensive
worms to measure to what extent Internet censorship is applied in China.
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He proposed ideas and techniques to be utilized by, what he named a human
rights worm [10]. No results about the worm performance has been reported.
Inspired by worm vaccinations, Wang et al. proposed a Susceptabe-
Exposed-Infected-Quarantined-Vaccinated (SEIQV) epidemic model that makes
use of vaccination and dynamic quarantine techniques to reduce the num-
ber of infected hosts and further contain the malicious worm. They have
also studied the impact of different parameters on their model, and run
simulations to evaluate its capabilities [105]. For further improvements, the
work can address the legal ground behind releasing the worm and provide
protective measures to keep the mechanism safe from adversaries.
Berbar et al. considered using beneficial worms to test distributed sys-
tems and verify the fault tolerance capabilities of such scattered software.
The worm closely monitors each entity of the distributed system then re-
ports error messages to a specific worm node for administrators to inspect
[13]. However, it is not clear if the worms are easily perceived and recog-
nized within the network and it is necessary to add an uninstalling func-
tionality in case these worms performed beyond expectations. Also work
can be further improved by addressing how the worm would perform in
large scale networks, in addition to, adding protective measure to keep the
worm operating away from malicious interference.
While, Yao et al. proposed a system that combines honeynets with anomaly
detectors to recognize and prevent malicious intrusions. Upon attack detec-
tion, each honeypot will release a peer to peer defensive worm to encounter
the malicious one. They have provided a P2P-based Benign Worm Model and
run simulations to assist and evaluate their work [111]. However, the legal
ground in which the defensive worm are released is not clear and protect-
ing worm communications is not highlighted to prevent adversaries from
hijacking the mechanism.
In the same direction, Toutonji et al., proposed a Passive Worm Dynamic
Quarantine (PWDQ) model, which describes a method to stop malicious
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worms by recovering infected hosts either by dynamic quarantine or pas-
sive benign worms techniques [101]. However, the approach can be further
enhanced by providing a procedure to remove the defensive worm when re-
leased, highlighting the legal ground on which the worm can be deployed,
clarifying how the worm can b easily observed in the network, and securing
the mechanism’s communications to block any malicious interventions.
Yong, improved on a previous vaccination structure that uses worms to
counter malicious ones. His modified structure does not require the worm
to download the payload from a central server and instead adds a ”Decod-
ing code” and a ”Resuming and Execution exe” phases to avoid the require-
ment of central servers, download connections, and download code [112].
Further improvements might be adding an entity to the structure responsi-
ble to stop or remove the counter-attack worm, to provide a safe exit in case
the worm went out of control.
Moreover, Nie et al. viewed peer to peer defensive worms as an adequate
solution to prevent malicious P2P worms. When two peers exchange files
the node with a higher patch version transfer the security patch to the lower
patch version node. They have provided a model for their work and run
several simulations to evaluate and examine their approach [75]. However,
it is not clear how the mechanism would perform in large scale networks or
how it can be uninstalled or removed from the network.
Al-Salloum et al. introduced a defensive worm that utilizes informa-
tion within the Link Layer to reconstruct topology information discovered
through the Link Layer Discovery Protocol in order to detect neighboring vul-
nerable nodes and propagate gradually until total coverage of the enterprise
network is reached [3]. While in another work they proposed what seems
to be the first computer worm that utilizes layer two of the OSI model as its
main propagation medium. They introduced a defensive worm that utilizes
topology information such as Content-Addressable Memory (CAM) tables and
Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) stored in switches. In this approach, the vul-
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nerability mitigation mechanism propagates through traversing switches
whilst probing vulnerable hosts until the network is covered [4, 5].
3.2.2 Implemented Defensive Worms
Few attempts were taken to deploy potential defensive worms in real world
networks. Most worms were released to confront and eliminate other ma-
licious worms, however, these attempts were not successful as they have
violated different laws. These worms, include:
Welchia. The Blaster worm variant [46, 30], was released to counter the
spreading of Blaster. Welchia, exploited the same vulnerability at the same
TCP port as Blaster to propagate. The vulnerability has been addressed by
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026 as a buffer overflow in Microsoft Re-
mote Procedural Call (RPC) service. Welchia, immunized a susceptible sys-
tem by exploiting the vulnerability and downloading the MS03-026 patch
then rebooting. However, the worm did not succeed in accomplishing its
goal and instead has caused more damage to the network. That is due to
two reasons: first, Welchia generated massive bandwidth by downloading
patches from the vendor server (windowsupdate.com); secondly, Blaster –
in addition to the traffic generated by Welchia – launched a denial of service
attack at windowsupdate.com. Furthermore, one variant of Welchia tried
to surpass the propagation speed of Blaster by increasing the propagating
threads to 300 (originally was 50) and the worm used an unrestricted ICMP
scanner with a short timeout, which made it become more unstable. Such
techniques to increase Welchia’s speed over Blaster have backfired by gen-
erating more network traffic [18, 104].
Different views have been expressed on Welchia, especially in regard to
its nature, weather it was good or bad? Even the intention behind releasing
the worm has been questioned, as it has been reported that some Welchia
variants have installed an unrestricted backdoor at their targets. Some other
views looked at Welchia as another malicious worm that tries to compete
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with the Blaster worm [18]. Based on our definition of malicious worms 2.5,
Welchia can be considered malicious, due to the damage it caused to the
Internet and its users, which violates laws issued by legislative bodies.
CRClean is a Code Red II variant, which exploits a buffer overflow vul-
nerability in the Index Server plug-in in Microsoft IIS Server as announced
by Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-033 [18]. CRClean has been designed
and presented by a German coder named Markus Kern [43]. CRClean has
used an interesting way to spread, it only spreads to systems that have at-
tempted to attack it. This technique is sometimes referred to as passive propa-
gation. The technique would normally reduce the network traffic usually in-
duced by worms that use active scanning to propagate. Another technique
utilized by CRClean was the intercepting of Code Reds malicious traffic,
which blocks any future infections of targets [18].
CRClean works by silently running on a system, waiting and listening
for Code Reds attacks. When CRClean intercepts an attack attempt from a
system infected by Code Red, it launches a counter attack to remove Code
Red and installs CRClean at the system that has launched the attack [57].
Furthermore, since CRClean is memory resident, it removes itself from the
system, once the system is shutdown (if the date is November, 2001 or
Later). Furthermore, for the worm to be detected and identified, it adds
a unique signature to server logs in which it has penetrated. Although, CR-
Clean has introduced some interesting techniques, it has not actually been
released on the Internet [18]. Even if it was released, it would most proba-
bly break into users machines without authorization, which is – at least – a
violation of the privacy law, which puts it in the malicious category.
Code-Green. Also written by a German programmer, who goes by the
name Herbert HexXer. Code-Green is designed to combat the Code Red II
worm. Because Microsoft IIS server can be exploited more than once, Code-
Green is able to attack Code Red infected systems [97]. Code-Green takes
several steps to eliminate Code Red. Once running on the machine, Code-
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Green writes a signature into the system memory identical to the way Code
Red’s writes its own signature. This signature is called an atom, which en-
sures that Code-Red will not re-infect the system again, as it appears to be
infected – while it is not. Next, Code-Green attempts to remove the back-
door (root.exe) installed by Code-Red. This backdoor provides a remote at-
tacker with full control on the IIS server. Also, Code-Green will disable the
virtual mapping previously created by Code Red II, which exposes drive
D and C to remote attackers. Then, Code-Green tries to determine the lan-
guage of the system to pick the correct patch. Subsequently, it downloads
and installs the Microsoft patch MS01-033 to fix the vulnerability already
utilized by Code Red II. Furthermore, Code-Green scans for systems that are
still infected by Code-Red II and patch them as well. Code-Green is mem-
ory resident, which means that once the system is rebooted Code-Green is
removed [57]. Yet, Code-Green writes a unique signature to the logs of the
targeted systems, indicating it has been there [43]. Although, Code-Green
was successfully tested on German language systems, it has not been re-
leased on the Internet [57, 18].
Cheese. Beneficial Worms are not meant only for Microsoft Windows
systems, but also for other platforms including Linux. Cheese was writ-
ten and released to overcome and clean the damage caused by the Linux
targeted malicious worm Lion (or 1i0n). On UDP port 53 (DNS), the Lion
worm was able to exploit a buffer-overflow vulnerability in the Transaction
Signature component of the BIND 8.1 server [71, 18]. Lion installed a back-
door listening on TCP port 10008, which binds to a command shell when
connected. Cheese scans for hosts that have the TCP port 10008 open and in
listening state, and then it connects to the port in order to propagate [71].
The worm scans IP addresses that belong to net blocks 193-218.1-254/16
randomly. When Cheese connects to its targets (port 10008) it gets bound to
a command shell where it can issue commands on the infected system. The
worm initiates a series of commands to load itself and remove any instances
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of the malicious worm Lion, in addition to disabling the backdoor service
from inetd [71, 18]. Although Cheese was meant to fix and clean its targets,
there were some observed disruptions and confusion on the network; that
is due to the immaturity of this technique [71].
Unlike Code Green, Cheese has been released on the Internet; however,
it was released in a small scale, and there was not much known effect on
the network [18]. It worth mentioning that Cheese breaches an important
feature of defensive worms, in which it propagates randomly, making the
worm spread out of control, let alone accessing users systems without con-
sent, leading the worm to be classified as malicious.
Anti-Santy. This worm was released to counter the Santy malicious
worm, which infects websites that uses phpBB based web forums [49]. Anti-
Santy, uses the same propagation method as Santy, which is by issuing spe-
cially crafted search requests to search engines, like google, to detect Inter-
net forums that run a vulnerable version of phpBB software. The worm then
penetrates these sites and downloads and installs a patch to recover the vul-
nerability. Anti-Santy also defaces websites it breaks into with a messages
such as: viewtopic.php secured by Anti-Santy-Worm V4. Your site is a bit safer,
but upgrade to≥ 2.0.11 [58]. The worm can not be described as beneficial as it
generates high traffic towards infected websites, slowing them down. More-
over, the worm defaces webpages without the owner’s permission, which
violates laws issued by legislative bodies, making Anti-Santy fit more in the
malicious category.
3.2.3 Worm Propagation Techniques
Computer worms differentiate based on the way they propagate. Worms
have adapted different techniques to locate vulnerabilities and propagate to
cover as many targets as possible. In this section we cover some of these
techniques, where most of them were utilized by malicious worms and are
not suitable to be used for beneficial purposes unless accompanied by prop-
65
3. DEFENSIVE WORMS – RELATED WORK
agation control measures. Worms like Code Red I and Slammer have used
random scanning techniques to find their targets, while even the Morris
worm (which utilized local subnet topology information) used a more intel-
ligent way of propagation [92]. The propagation speed increases when the
worm incorporates information to locate all vulnerable hosts, such as in the
Flash worms [93].
A ”hit-list” worm would incorporate information about a number of vul-
nerable hosts where then it will switch to random scanning after scanning
all the hosts in the hit-list. This was proposed by Staniford et al., with further
targeting enhancements, suggested e.g. by Fan and Xiang [26].
Worms like SQLsnake, use a built-in list of numbers that will be used
later to generate network addresses to probe for vulnerabilities, these num-
bers are generated according to network space that most probably contain
vulnerable targets [71]. Zou et al. proposed a routing worm which scans
based on the information provided by the Border Gateway Protocol to re-
duce scanning space [118]. They also introduced a divide-and-conquer scan
worm which uses the divide and conquer approach to propagate. When the
target is infected it passes half of the scanning space to the target and con-
tinues scanning the other half of its original space [117].
Code Red II used different scanning techniques where hosts closer to
the infected target are scanned with higher probability than those farther
away [66]. This is a scanning technique referred to as Island Hopping, as
the network is viewed as a collection of islands, where an island receives
specific attention before hopping to another island [71].
Vojnovic´ et al. identified optimal static and dynamic propagating strate-
gies. These proposed strategies minimize the total number of sampling to
reach a target fraction [103]. In one strategy, a worm infects a randomly se-
lected host then tries to spread on the same subnet, as long as there are many




Markus Kern has introduced CRclean, a worm that spreads passively by
listening to Code Red I scanning attempts. When Code Red I scans a host
that already has CRclean installed, CRclean will respond to the scanning
activity by reinfecting the scanning source host and removing the malicious
worm to provide remediation and containment of Code Red I malicious
spread [50]. Blacklists were used by Conficker, the list contained entities
that might provide remedies and containment actions towards malicious
code, such as anti-virus sites and Microsoft, the worm will not try to scan
IPs in the list to avoid detection [53].
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we described attempts that involved utilizing worms for de-
fensive or beneficial purposes. These attempts were covered based on pub-
lished literature or actual attempts of releasing potential defensive worms.
We have also highlighted the propagation techniques that worms usually
use to disseminate around the network, as worms mainly differentiate based
on the way they propagate. This chapter tries to set – at least – a semi com-
prehensive resource for previous work that involves defensive worms to aid




A Vulnerability Mitigation Worm –
Seawave I
4.1 Overview
We have defined and provided a taxonomy and an overview of defensive
worms and the challenges the industry face in preventing or reducing the
severity of network vulnerabilities in Chapter 2; followed by a summary
of previous work that involved worms for beneficial purposes and worm
propagation techniques at Chapter 3. In this Chapter we present a novel
controlled, interactive, self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained
vulnerability mitigation worm named Seawave1. The mechanism probes for
vulnerabilities within an enterprise network by plotting agents during its
gradual propagation. The defensive worm utilizes layer two topology in-
formation collected from network switches to achieve minimum bandwidth
usage and maximize network coverage. To the best of our knowledge Sea-
wave is the first computer worm to utilize the data link layer (of the OSI
model) as its main propagation medium.
4.2 Network Topology Model and Simulation Environment
In the design of the simulation environment, we have taken into account
where the mechanism will most probably and most beneficially be deployed.
The networks were designed in a hierarchical manner with a varying num-
1Named after the observed wavy propagation curve of the mechanism, which mimics the waves
of a sea – see Fig. 9.4 of Chapter 9.
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ber of Local Area Networks (LANs) connected to each other through a back-
bone. These hierarchical topologies mimic, to a large extent, enterprise
networks where the mechanism experiences disparate bandwidth capacity
within the backbone and main network links as well as the considerably
higher bandwidth available within switches.
For modeling purposes, we divide network nodes into three types: Hosts,
switches, and routers. Fig. 4.1 illustrates an example of a 1000 node net-
work. For more accuracy in the results, different numbers and layouts of
hierarchical networks have been designed for simulations. Network nodes
have been chosen randomly and linked to randomly selected switches un-
der a specified probability; switches are then connected randomly based on
a specified probability to form an acyclic local topology. After forming the
LAN, a switch is then selected randomly to be linked to a router located in
the backbone to form a LAN connected to the backbone; this process repeats
until the whole enterprise network is completed.
The Drop Tail queue management algorithm [21] was used as a queuing
algorithm and for performance measurements, we have – without loss of
generality – assumed duplex network links with 100Mbps bandwidth; the
simulations in Section 4.7 have used different networks with a node number
varying between 100 and 8000.
For our simulations we have assumed the following:
• The network implements STP and is loop-free.
• Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [38] is supported.
• Vulnerability discovery packets have a length of 900 bytes.
• CAM/port status is maintained by switches.
We have generated 17 hierarchical networks consisting of different num-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Switched network that implements Spanning Tree Protocol
4.3 Seawave I
Seawave is a controlled, interactive, self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-
contained vulnerability mitigation worm. It utilizes network topology knowl-
edge to propagate in a constructive manner that would not impact network
resources. It uses the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) information to identify
switches and then reads Content Addressable Memory (CAM) tables stored
in switches to identify nodes and directly connected switches [1] . Note,
that topology information is read step-by-step (and not as a whole) as the
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Figure 4.2: Seawave I
defensive worm propagates gradually. Based on this, paths are constructed
dynamically and on a switch-by-switch basis, updating STP and CAM in-
formation on each step to discover directly connected hosts and switches.
To illustrate the propagation process, assume that in Fig. 4.2 Seawave
was installed on node A where it reads STP and CAM information from
Switch 1 and performs vulnerability discovery on Stations B, C and simul-
taneously reads CAM tables of neighboring switches, in this case Switch 2
and 5. The Seawave agent then process the CAM tables and picks a station
at each neighboring switch to self-replicate. The agent picked station E to
propagate to Switch 2 then the same procedure repeats until the Spanning
Tree path is covered.
For concurrent propagation, Seawave assumes all nodes are vulnerable.
In Fig. 4.2 nodes A, E, and I will act as a vulnerability discovery server
for the nodes directly connected to the switch. This will lower the trans-
mission distance, would keep any bandwidth generated within this process
contained within leaf edges without impacting the heavily used network
links, and would allow the defensive worm to detect un-propped nodes
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quickly. For example if a node was off-line during the process of vulnerabil-
ity discovery, then when the node is back on-line the vulnerability discovery
server of the switch will try to detect the new node and thereafter probe it;
identifying intermittently active hosts is detailed in Chapter 5.
The resources for the agent to start detecting vulnerabilities should not
require a large amount of CPU or memory to probe few host nodes con-
nected to one switch. This allows the agent to share station resources with
minimum overhead. Otherwise, alternatives can be considered, such as
probing when the server node is on idle status – bound to the severity of
the vulnerability.
4.4 Propagation Algorithm
For Seawave to propagate around the network it has to visit each switch
attached to the spanning tree. We consider the whole network as N, where
N = {LAN0, LAN1, . . . LANn} . Each subnet consist of one router and sev-
eral switches and hosts, which represents one domain (i.e. for the purposes
of this thesis we do not consider VLAN configurations; these can be handled
analogously), and each switch in the subnet exists as part of the spanning
tree path of that particular subnet.
We denote STPi as the spanning tree information stored in switch i.
STPi{BridgeID} denotes the Bridge ID of switch i and STPi{DesBridge} denotes
the designate Bridge of switch i, which is the next bridge in the ST path and
we denote Sij as interface j at switch i. For the switch to decide where to
forward packets, it refers to its CAM table (or MAC forwarding address ta-
ble). When the switch receives a packet it compares the destination MAC
with those entries in the CAM table. If there is a match, the packet will be
forwarded to the designated port, otherwise it is sent to all ports [86].
We denote the CAM table of switch i at port j as Cij and the MAC ad-
dress of switch i as SiMAC . In order for an agent to start spreading be-
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tween switches, it has to be able to detect a direct connection between two
switches. A direct connection between two switches is when two switches –
which exist in the spanning tree path – are connected with no other elements
between them. This will enable the agent-based mechanism to propagate
gradually and avoid redundant probes.
We therefore first state a lemma that builds a sufficient base for a switch
directly connected to another switch assuming that the IEEE specification of
the Spanning Tree Protocol [1] is honored:
Lemma 4.1
Interface Sij and Skl are directly connected to each other if and only if STPi{Des.Bridge} =
STPk{BridgeID} when Sij → Skl or STPk{Dec.Bridge} = STPi{BridgeID} when
Skl → Sij
It is not straightforward to detect directly connected switches. Few ap-
proaches exist to detect direct connections. One of them proposed by Bre-
itbart et al. [15], states that two switches interfaces Sij and Skl are directly
connected if and only if Cij ∪ Ckl = u and Cij ∩ Ckl = Φ. u here denotes
all MAC addresses of routers and switches in a subnet S. However, the as-
sumption that a CAM table at a given interface does contain all the MAC
addresses that can be received from the same interface is not satisfied in
all real-world networks [15] owing to aging properties of CAM tables and
communication demand. When a network element becomes idle on that in-
terface, the source MAC address might be removed from the table affecting
the above assumption. Furthermore, an element might not need to perform
any network activity that passes through that specific switch interface, re-
sulting in the MAC address of the element not existing in the CAM table at
all.
Another approach is proposed by Stott [95] where the spanning tree in-
formation is read using SNMP from all switches and routers to construct
the network topology. However, this approach will generate bandwidth ac-
74
4.4 PROPAGATION ALGORITHM
cording to the number of switches and routers which is large in corporate
networks; in addition, the topology might go through different changes in
the process of collecting STP information.
In Seawave, the agent, however, tries to combine both CAM table infor-
mation and Spanning Tree information to detect a direct link between two
switches and therefore propagate switch by switch until the LAN is cov-
ered. In order to detect directly connected switches, we assume that each
CAM table of each switch holds at least the MAC address(es) of the directly
connected switch(es). Switches exchange Bridge Protocol Data Unit pack-
ets [1] that hold spanning tree information quite often (every two seconds
by default) [86] enabling this assumption to most likely be reflected in real
world networks.
Under the assumption that the network implements STP according to
the standard IEEE 802.1D [1] with default settings we now introduce the
following Lemma:
Lemma 4.2
If Sij is directly connected to Skl then {SiMAC , SkMAC} ⊆ (Cij ∪ Ckl) and Cij ∩
Ckl = Φ
PROOF Assume that SiMAC does not exist in Ckl and SkMAC does not exist in
Cij , therefore, {SiMAC , SkMAC} 6⊆ (Cij ∪ Ckl). However, according to lemma
4.1 STPi{Des.Bridge} = STPk{BridgeID} or STPk{Dec.Bridge} = STPi{BridgeID} and
according to the default STP settings a switch would emit BPDU frames
once every 2 seconds, which is much less than the default CAM table aging
time (5 minutes) [86]. Thus, there exist bidirectional STP traffic between the
directly connected switches Si and Sk. As a consequence, Ckl contains SiMAC
and Cij contains SkMAC which is a contradiction 
The ability of the agents to propagate through the network then follows
from lemma 4.1 and 4.2.
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We denote the hosts connected to the directly connected switch asH(Cs0)
where Cs0 is the CAM table of switch s0. And S(Cs0) = {s1, s2, ..sn} as
switches listed in the CAM table C of switch s0; while (C ∪ STP )s0 as the
CAM table and STP information of switch s0. We denote the function of
fetching data through SNMP as SNMP and agent self-replicating as SR.
And the function of vulnerability detection and selecting a host from a list
as V D and select, respectively. The propagation algorithm of Seawave, then
follows:
1. Install Agent at the starting host at corporate subnet.
2. Agent starts self-replicating to all subnets according to predefined hosts
in each subnet: SR(LAN1 ∪ LAN2.. ∪ LANn)
3. In each subnet the agent reads STP and CAM table information from
the directly connected switch: SNMP{(C ∪ STP )s0}
4. The agent extracts directly connected hosts from the CAM table then
performs vulnerability detection to these hosts: V D(H(Cs0)−{Hagent})
5. Based on lemma 4.2, agent reads STP and CAM table information from
switches listed in the CAM table of the directly connected switch (S(Cs0)):
SNMP{(C ∪ STP )s1 ∪ (C ∪ STP )s2 ..∪ (C ∪ STP )sn} and then detects
directly connected switches based on lemma 4.12.
6. The agent picks a host in each neighbor switch and self-replicate to
propagate on the same subnet: SR(select(H(Cs1)) ∪ select(H(Cs2)).. ∪
select(H(Csn)))
7. Go to step 3 until all neighboring switches in the STP path are visited.
Seawave depends on the information retrieved from CAM tables and
STP that are stored at each switch. Fortunately, it is not necessary to rely on
proprietary protocols, as it is possible to adopt widely supported standards,
such as SNMP management information base (MIB) objects to retrieve this
2For the directly connected switch towards STP root, the agent can consider SkMAC address
instead of requesting STPk{BridgeID} – assuming that the Bridge ID consist of the switch MAC.
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information, giving Seawave more flexibility and portability over different
networks with different types of switches.
4.5 Vulnerability Detection
In our simulations, we have assumed that one packet is enough to detect
a vulnerability and install an agent; which mimics – to some extent – SQL
Slammer which uses a single packet to propagate [63]. Of course, one packet
is not enough to contain a payload that performs complex tasks (or deal
with multiple vulnerabilities), however, for such tasks larger payloads can
be used.
Different approaches exist to detect a vulnerability, one of them is by
exploiting. The agent will try to probe a potential vulnerable machine by
sending a packet with the necessary payload to achieve three tasks.
• First, exploit the vulnerability to gain the necessary privilege to apply
temporally remediation.
• Second, apply vulnerability remediation to eliminate the security ex-
posure of the vulnerable machine.
• Third, trigger the agent for further propagation to cover other vulner-
able nodes.
Vulnerability remediation is temporary and clearly is not substitute for
a code-level patch and can range of different techniques, such as disabling
a port that can be used by a malicious user to compromise a machine, or
installing a wrapper script that will act as a packet filter between the vul-
nerable application and the network, or even uninstalling the vulnerable
application. Whatever remediation is used by the network security team, it
must have the required privilege to assure successful deployment.
Seawave, should be deployed carefully as its payload might be exposed
to network users with malicious intention; but the mechanism will most
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likely be triggered by the enterprise security team in response to a critical
vulnerability with an already publicly available exploit – more risks and
threats are addressed in Chapter 5. If exploitation was successful, the node
is vulnerable, otherwise, the node most likely is not. This approach would
eliminate the amount of false positives, usually reported by vulnerability
discovery applications [83]. However, the exploitation procedure must be
performed carefully as it can lead to service disruption, where it might get
the system into a halt or unstable state, bound to the nature of the vulner-
ability and its exploit. Tests should be conducted before deploying any
exploit. However, when this cannot be ensured a secondary propagation
mechanism must be used.
4.6 Randomly Scanning Worm
We designed a simple random scanning worm to compare it with our mech-
anism in terms of bandwidth. Most worms released to counter malicious
ones used random scanning (i.e. Welchia, Cheese). The comparison would
help show if employing topology information would improve bandwidth
utilization. Indeed, excessive bandwidth usage is observed frequently in
worm outbreaks. The random scanning worm mimics the Slammer worm
that uses a random scanning technique where it targets a randomly chosen
IP, by sending one UDP packet to its victims [63] but with slight difference
as the random scanning worm operates in corporate networks specifically
at layer two of the OSI model.
When the worm is initiated, it propagates to all LANs in the corporate
network according to a hard coded destination host at each LAN. Then, the
randomly scanning worm will utilize the information in the host to indicate
the address range it can randomly choose from. This is done by reading the
IP address and the subnet mask, of the host. We have assumed for the simu-
lation a class A network with subnet mask 255.255.192.0. The address space
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thereafter consists of 16384 IP addresses; ignoring the network address and
the broadcast address yields 16382 possible target hosts.
The worm uses one packet of size 900 bytes to infect, and we assume
all hosts are vulnerable. However, there are switches and routers that the
worm might scan, with no infection as the vulnerability exists only in host
nodes.
4.7 Simulation Results
Since each network has different topology and parameter choices, it is some-
what difficult to find a closed-form complexity estimate for the vulnerability
discovery mechanism; we have therefore chosen to conduct extensive net-
work simulations of our mechanism. For the results to be more realistic
following the model and assumptions outlined in section 4.2, hierarchical
networks were used, reflecting typical network topologies in large-scale en-
terprise networks.
All simulations have been conducted using the Network Simulator 2
(NS-2), a discrete event simulator mainly used for research activities [42].
The simulations in total were 765 running within hierarchical networks.
Since the capacity of NS-2 is limited, we weren’t able to conduct simula-
tions on topologies over 8000 network nodes. Therefore, we have run our
simulations against 100 to 8000 nodes with around 500 nodes difference be-
tween each topology.
For more accurate results each topology has been simulated 45 times
where the average has been calculated to account for random effects such
as link and node operation failure in addition to time coverage. In addition
to Seawave’s simulation, we have performed simulations of a random scan-
ning worm following the model and assumptions outlined in section 4.6.
However, due to the extensive amount of communications and bandwidth
consumption of such random propagation strategy, the time of simulation
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was beyond our capacity, and therefore we settled down with one simula-
tion of network topologies ranging from 100 to 3000 nodes.
In each simulation we have gathered the following:
• The number of nodes that were missed (i.e. not probed) by Seawave,
due to a link failure of probability 0.01
• The number of packets generated by both the defensive worm and the
randomly scanning worm to cover the network. The packets, however,
that are generated between a switch and a host are exempted since
they have no significant overhead on the bandwidth of the network.
The packet size is 900 bytes.
• The time it took Seawave to cover the corporate network. Time is mea-
sured in simulation seconds and when there is a link failure, the mech-
anism will try to resend a packet after 2 simulation seconds.
• The number of random worm scans of non-existent IP addresses.
For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed in the simulation that the
CAM table and STP information stored in the switch can be requested by
sending one packet to the switch.
4.8 Discussion
Seawave in its first stage will be installed in the host dedicated to be the
starting node. Since the directly connected switch is transparent, the Sea-
wave agent does not actually see it. However, the agent can impersonate
a switch and therefore can learn the designated switch MAC address from
STP traffic. Then following the propagation algorithm outlined in section
4.4; the agent spreads around the network. Since switches do not necessar-
ily have Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) [31] servers running
on them (that maps the MAC address to its IP address), getting the IP ad-
















































Figure 4.4: The random scanning worm number of scan attempts of non-existent IP
addresses
Breitbart et al. [15] use SNMP MIB object ipNetToMediaTable in a sin-
gle subnet switch domain to get the MAC after providing an IP address
calculated based on network mask and IP address format of the router.
Furthermore, Stott [95] listed other approaches which includes scanning
all STP tables using every IP address in a given range and the Bridge ID
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Figure 4.5: Missed nodes under link failure probability of 0.01
extracted from SNMP MIB object dot1dBaseBridgeAddress that matches the
MAC would be the switch IP address. Another approach would be to scan
switches to read the CAM tables searching for entries that matches the Bridge
ID and whose SNMP MIB object dot1dTpFdbStatus is set to self, which
means the address is assigned to the switch [95].
Since Seawave operates at layer two there is no necessity to use IP ad-
dresses, but this requirement arises when communicating through SNMP,
as it operates at the application layer in the OSI model. In fact, the network
interface card (NIC) would accept a packet with a broadcast IP address set
as a destination. Therefore, assuming the switch does not have a firewall,
one way to communicate is by using the switch’s actual MAC address and
the broadcast IP address of the subnet as a destination to allow the packet
to reach its way to the application layer (SNMP server).
Seawave eases the impact on primary network links by depending largely
on host to switch links to detect close targets which also provide short trans-
























Figure 4.6: Simulation time required to cover entire network. After replicating
failure, another attempt is triggered after 2 seconds.
Seawave generated 1564 packets to cover a network of 4000 elements, 2454
packets to cover 6000 elements, and 3232 to cover 8000 network elements.
And in comparison to a randomly scanning worm, the defensive worm has
generated 560 packets in a network of 1500 nodes, while the random scan-
ning worm generated 23074 packets of the size 900 bytes, indicating the
ability of Seawave to cover the network using 2.42% of the bandwidth used
by random scanning. Moreover, the random worm generated 31358 packets
to cover a network of 2500 nodes while our mechanism required 896 pack-
ets, about 2.8% of the random worm generated bandwidth. Further results
are shown in Fig. 4.3.
The random scanning worm has generated too many scans to non-existent
IP addresses. Although the worm operates within the LAN, non-existent
IP addresses scans will cause the host to emit an ARP probe [80] for each
new IP address scanning attempt. For a network topology of the size of
1500 it resulted in 3660723 non-existent IP address scan attempts. Further-
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more, 5165367 nonexistent host scan attempts (or missed connections) were
recorded for a network of the size 2500. Results are shown in Fig. 4.4.
Since the defensive worm depends on the up-to-date CAM and STP in-
formation stored in switches, missed connections are not common (i.e. prob-
ing a non-existent device) and the total bandwidth is used as effectively as
possible without wasting communications. Seawave in its current form is
probabilistic in that it does not ensure that all nodes on the switch have
been probed for vulnerability (i.e. no failure recovery). Therefore, differ-
ent missed nodes were reported under a link failure probability of 0.01. For
instance, a network with 2000 hosts, 20 of them were missed and 52 nodes
were unreached in a 5000 nodes network. The larger the network, the higher
the rate of missed host nodes – more results can be seen in Fig. 4.5.
The time it takes the mechanism to cover the network is measured in
simulation seconds. In a network of 1500 elements it took Seawave 2.6 sim-
ulation seconds to spread around the spanning tree and 3.6 simulation sec-
onds to cover a 5000 nodes network. Of course the time is affected by link
failures, the mechanism will wait 2 simulation seconds before trying to self-
replicate after a link failure. Fig. 4.6 shows more results.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter we have proposed a controlled self-replicating, self-propagating,
and self-contained vulnerability mitigation mechanism (Seawave) as one
approach to probe for network vulnerabilities. The mechanism is topology-
aware, which limits its bandwidth consumption and reduces the risk of un-
controlled propagation. Our defensive worm makes use of two types of in-
formation stored in switches: CAM table and Spanning Tree protocol. This
topology information, enables Seawave to propagate around the network in




Seawave adds some constraints to the self-replicating process by limiting
replication to one node only directly connected to the switch and enabling
that node to act as a vulnerability discovery entity to the remaining nodes
directly connected to the same switch. The node would subsequently act as
a neighborhood watch node, where the neighborhood consist of all nodes con-
nected to the switch. In the chapter we presented the amount of bandwidth
Seawave would generate in different hierarchical networks. The results also
showed the amount of time – in simulation seconds – it took Seawave to
spread around the network by following the spanning tree and under the
link failure probability of p = 0.01.
The chapter presented the number of nodes that might be missed in the
the process of vulnerability discovery. Also, bandwidth wise, we have com-
pared our proposed vulnerability mitigation mechanism with a malicious
worm that spread using random scanning. Ongoing and future work is fo-
cused on increasing both the robustness and performance of the algorithm
in the face of intermittent bridging (e.g. found in wireless links) and de-




A Vulnerability Mitigation Worm –
Seawave II
5.1 Overview
In this chapter we further enhance and improve Seawave I by adding edge
node failure recovery, network backbone traversal, and intermittent node
detection and recovery. These new features allow the defensive worm to
ensure sound coverage by assuring each node has been probed for vulner-
abilities and it also allows the mechanism to independently traverse the en-
terprise network without human intervention – Seawave I required human
intervention – and it adds the capability to detect powered down, discon-
nected, or portable devices as soon as they connect to the enterprise net-
work. Risks and threats to the mechanism are also addressed in this chapter.
5.2 Network Topology Model
The network model we have used for Seawave II follows the one described
in Chapter 4, Section 4.2; however, to observe how the vulnerability mit-
igation mechanism deals with topology updates and intermittently active
hosts, each node was set to run under two modes: online and offline. When
the node is in the offline mode it can not be seen by the mechanism and
is considered disconnected until it becomes online. Fig. 5.1 shows an ex-
ample of a small 100-node network, with a switch and hosts in the offline
mode. In the simulation we have assumed the enterprise network supports
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Figure 5.1: A 100 node hierarchical network that implements STP with scattered
disconnected, i.e. offline, nodes (gray links), including a switch.
the following:
• Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
• Spanning Tree Protocol STP and is loop-free.
• Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [67, 68] as a routing protocol.
• CAM and port status is maintained by switches.
We have generated 17 hierarchical networks consisting of offline nodes
and switches; nodes are linked via a duplex-link where packets can flow in
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both directions, and for the results reported in section 5.7, the number of
nodes was chosen between 100 and 8000, with link bandwidth set to 100
Mbps and assuming a discovery packet size of 900 bytes. If we consider a
switch domain as a switch with its directly connected hosts, then there exist
three failures that Seawave II might encounter, including:
• Self-replicating failure to the next switch domain.
• Failure when probing an edge node.
• Self-replicating failure to the next LAN.
The cause of failures, however, is either due to a link or a node operation
failure. In both cases the agent will try to recover the failure. More simula-
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Figure 5.2: Traverse Backbone Algorithm
5.3 Seawave II
The vulnerability mitigation mechanism proposed in Chapter 4 (Seawave I)
falls short in performing edge node failure recovery and topology change
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detection, which is detrimental when confronted with volatile edge net-
works. It also does not provide an algorithm for traversing the network
backbone, which requires assigning a host at each LAN as a starting point.
Therefore, in this section we provide enhancements to address these limita-
tions.
In order to provide edge node failure recovery, Seawave will wait for a
response from edge nodes to ensure successful probes; upon failure to re-
spond, the agent will retry after 0.5 seconds. For the vulnerability mitigation
agent to be able to propagate from one LAN to another, it needs to map the
topology of the backbone. Since the OSPF routing protocol is implemented,
the agent upon detection of a router during its propagation, sends to the
router an SNMP MIB request to fetch the OSPF Link State Database (LSD),
which gives a complete description of the backbone, including: Routers,
network segments, and how they are interconnected [69]. This database
is built by the collection of Link State Advertisements (LSA) sent by each
router in the backbone to describe its local routing information. The agent
also reads the ARP cache of the LAN interface of each router to detect a
host IP address in order to self-replicate to. For example, Fig. 5.2 shows a
sample of a network of four LANs connected by a backbone that consists of
four routers. When the agent reachesH1 and detects a router device (e.g. by
checking the SNMP MIB value of ipForwarding if set to one then the device
is a router [15]), it will send an SNMP MIB request ospfLsdbTable to fetch the
LSD [69] and the ARP cache stored at router A using SNMP MIB ipNetTo-
MediaTable; upon receiving router’s A response the agent at H1 extracts the
backbone network map, which in this example consists of routers A,B,C,
and D. The agent thereafter sends an SNMP MIB request to routers B, C,
and D to fetch the stored ARP cache of network interfaces connected to the
LAN. In parallel, the agent picks a host in the ARP cache table of router A
to detect a valid IP address that belongs to a LAN directly connected to the
router for the agent to propagate (No IP will be picked in the case of the
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example, since there is only one LAN connected to router A). The agent
subsequently attempts to self-replicate to the selected IP address and waits
to receive replies from routers B, C, and D containing ARP cache tables.
Upon receiving the tables, the agent picks one IP address for each LAN and
self-replicates to it; to ensure comprehensive coverage of all LANs in the
enterprise network.
We denote the list of LANs connected to the first router encountered
by the mechanism as L(ARPR0) where ARPR0 is the ARP cache stored at
routerR0. And we denote LSD stored in the first router as LSDR0 , where the
number of routers according to the database is LSDR0 {N}. We denote the
function of fetching data through SNMP as SNMP and agent self-replicating
as SR. The algorithm for traversing the backbone, then follows:
1. Fetch Link State Database (LSD) and ARP cache from the first encoun-
tered router, using SNMP: SNMP {LSDR0 ∪ ARPR0}
2. Pick an IP address from each LAN interface (else the source LAN inter-
face) in the ARP cache of the first encountered router and self-replicate
to that IP address: SR(L(ARPR0)− {L0})
3. Fetch ARP cache from all other routers in the backbone (according to
LSD), using SNMP: SNMP
{
ARPR1 ∪ ARPR2 ∪ . . . ARPRLSDR0{N}
}
4. Pick an IP address from each LAN interface in the ARP caches of back-
bone routers and self-replicate to these IP addresses: SR(L(ARPR1) ∪
L(ARPR2) · · · ∪ L(ARPRLSDR0{N}))
The algorithm assumes that the autonomous system consists of a single
area only, where a single read of the LSD is enough to determine the map
of the backbone. Dividing the backbone into more than one area is used in
very large networks to reduce the size of routing tables, but can be handled
in a straightforward manner.
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5.4 Intermittently Active Hosts and Topology Changes
In dynamic networks, it is difficult to achieve efficient coverage of a net-
work with transient nodes without excessive scanning frequency. However,
by utilizing topology information it is possible for Seawave to determine
topology changes and intermittently active hosts for vulnerability discov-
ery. The Seawave agent takes advantage of the CAM table stored in the
switch and stores it during the first scan round. After 0.5 simulation sec-
onds, the switch is probed for the CAM table and checked for changes; new
nodes or switches are thereafter detected by the agent and probed.
When a new switch is listed in the CAM table the agent has to verify that
it is actually a directly connected switch, by using Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2.
Intermittently active hosts and topology changes detection can, therefore,
be achieved by the following algorithm:
1. Fetch CAM table from the directly connected switch.
2. Compare the CAM table with the locally stored previous CAM table.
3. Probe newly detected edge nodes.
4. Probe newly detected switches devices according to Lemma 4.1 and
Lemma 4.2
5. Go to step 1 each time t
Note that to speed up the simulation, we have chosen 0.5 simulation
seconds for the agent to check the CAM table. However, the interval may
be up to 5 minutes (the default expiration time for CAM tables stored in
switches) [86]. But what about systems missing from the CAM table due to
inactivity or table age expiration? Those systems will be treated as offline
nodes and will be detected when they become active as per the algorithm.
The agent can also check for topology changes by listening to BPDUs
emitted from the root switch. When a topology change occurs, i.e. when
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a switch port goes into forwarding status or from forwarding (or learn-
ing) into blocking, the switch will emit a Topology Change Notification (TCN)
BPDU to the next switch (towards the root bridge) until the root switch re-
ceives the TCN BPDU and emits a configuration BPDU with the topology
change bit set. The BPDU emitted by the root is sent to all switches and
thereafter the agent can listen to it, where it can trigger a topology change
detection. However, in case the agent might miss a topology change BPDU
we have set the agent to check for network topology changes each 0.5 sim-
ulation second.
5.5 Design Components of Seawave
Nazario et al. defined different components that constitute a worm system
[72]. We use their components to describe the design of our mechanism with
slight modifications. Seawave consists of three components that allow it to
cover the network as follows:
• Reconnaissance. This component is responsible for discovering host
nodes that are vulnerable. Seawave II reads CAM tables stored in
switches to detect edge node hosts to probe for vulnerabilities. The
mechanism also reads STP in addition to the CAM table to determine
next switch to propagate to.
• Probe Component. This component describes the method Seawave’s
uses to detect a vulnerability at a target node. For the sake of simplic-
ity, our simulation assumed all hosts to be susceptible and it requires
only one packet of the size 900 bytes to exploit a vulnerable node.
• Communication. This component describes the communication between
agents. Seawave II enables communication between agents by sending
an acknowledgment packet to the sender agent to only ensure that the
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self-replicating task has been accomplished successfully so as to dis-
able any blocking attempts.
These three components summarize the design of the vulnerability mit-
igation mechanism; further extensions are discussed briefly in section 5.9.
5.6 Risks and Threats
Since the propagation path depends on topology information, any malicious
interactions with STP, OSPF, ARP, SNMP, or CAM tables might have nega-
tive impact on Seawave’s behavior. For example, the lack of authentication
of the STP protocol, makes it possible for a malicious user to manipulate the
topology and compromise the integrity of BPDUs leading to undesirable ac-
tions such as changing switch port status or electing a compromised switch
as root. Yet, although these vulnerabilities do not relate to the agent directly,
any countermeasure to prevent such abuse would participate in the protec-
tion of the defensive worm itself. Some protection measures do exist for
STP, such as disabling user ports upon detection of STP traffic and disabling
ports that emit false BPDUs that elect false roots.
A malicious user flooding a CAM table with fake MAC addresses, will
cause the switch to act as a hub, with no edge information for the agent to
utilize. One possible mitigation to such misuse would be shutting down
a port if more than one MAC were detected, performance issues however,
should be considered when applying such mitigation.
For the agent to traverse the backbone it has to read the ARP cache stored
in the router. ARP cache poisoning may redirect the agent to an IP address –
out of Seawave’s scope – inserted by malicious users, however, the agent can
be designed to ignore any IP address that do not adhere to certain attributes
put by the enterprise security team. ARP cache poisoning can be achieved
by sending malformed gratuitous ARPs to the target machine, however, pri-
vate VLANs can – to some extent – eliminate such abuse, as they do not
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allow nodes on different ports to communicate at layer two but still allow
them to share the same network space.
Since the agent uses SNMP in its communication with network devices
(e.g. switches and routers) a malicious user can intercept this line of com-
munication and alter it according to its attack preference. When the agent,
for example, probes a neighboring switch to determine if it is directly con-
nected to the current switch, the attacker can respond with an SNMP mes-
sage that indicates the switch to be a non-neighbor switch. This will cause
the agent to ignore the switch, and might cause the agent itself to stop any
further propagation. Another scenario, would be an attacker altering the
router response to fetch the OSPF Link State Database SNMP request, giv-
ing the attacker the freedom to define the backbone map according to his
intrusion preference and using it as an input to the mechanism.
Even if we assumed the agents to not be vulnerable to STP, ARP, or
SNMP attacks; a switch domain can be isolated from the vulnerability dis-
covery process by turning the agent off physically (weather the intention
malicious or due to human error). Also, the agent can be controlled re-
motely if it was running under a vulnerable operating system where an at-
tacker can exploit or if the intruder was able to compromise a privileged
user account on the agent host. To reduce these threats, different protective
measures and performance aspects of Seawave are addressed in Chapter 7
followed by a formal threat analysis model of Seawave in Chapter 8.
5.7 Simulation Results
Based on the simulation aspects and the random scanning model described
in Chapter 4 section 4.7 and 4.6; in addition to the assumptions mentioned in
section 5.2, we have run our simulations and gathered the following results:
• Number of link failures under p = 0.01.
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Figure 5.4: Time to cover the whole enterprise network
• Number of node operation failures under p = 0.05. Note that node
operation failures are caused by the node itself (e.g. system is busy or
in different state due to restarting).
• Number of packets generated by both Seawave II and the randomly
scanning worm to cover the network. The packets, however, that are


















































Random Scanning Malicious Worm
Figure 5.6: Number of packets generated by randomly scanning worm in compar-
ison to our scanning mechanism
no significant impact on the bandwidth of the network.
• Time it takes the mechanism to cover the corporate network. When
there is a link or a node operation failure, the mechanism will retry
after 0.5 simulation seconds.
• Time it took the mechanism to detect all new network nodes that have
just joined the network. In all simulations the network nodes were ran-
97

























Figure 5.7: The random scanning worm number of scan attempts of non-existent IP
addresses
domly added to the topology at different locations. All offline nodes
became online at the 2.5 second of the simulation time.
• Number of random worm scans of non-existent IP addresses.
For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed in the simulation, that the
CAM table and STP information stored in the switch can be requested by
sending one packet. A single SNMP MIB request is also assumed to fetch
OSPF information in addition to ARP cache table stored in the router.
5.8 Discussion
Seawave tries to combine both the distinctive exploring nature of self-replication
programs and the constraints of the enterprise network, to provide a sound
protection without disturbance to the network focal interests. It appears
that by using network topology information it is possible to dramatically




Seawave I (see Chapter 4) had some limitations in its capability to spread
around the network and achieve sound coverage without human interven-
tion (i.e. hard coding a single host IP at each LAN to bypass the backbone).
The improvements thereafter are required to address these limitations to
produce a more robust vulnerability discovery mechanism. Three limita-
tions of the previous approach have been addressed by Seawave II. First,
it adds edge node failure recovery ensuring that all network nodes are not
missed; this is important since one vulnerable node can cause a threat to the
whole enterprise network. Second, it provides an algorithm to detect newly
added network devices, which ensures that a vulnerable node joining the
enterprise network get probed as soon as possible to minimize the time of
vulnerability exposure. Third, it provides an algorithm to bypass the net-
work backbone utilizing protocols such as OSPF and ARP; which gives the
mechanism the capability to spread and cover the vulnerable network as
fast as possible to achieve absolute protection.
As in any mechanism Seawave is not fully immune to threats and risks.
The mechanism depends on topology information to propagate, which leaves
it bound to the protection measures applied to this information. Vulnerable
STP allows a malicious user to control and define the path the mechanism
would take; this could allow the attacker to hide nodes from the mecha-
nism, or even cause a denial of service attack by adding network loops to
the topology. Notice that this is not a direct attack on Seawave itself but on
the feedback the mechanism uses to function. The same applies to the CAM
table, what if a malicious user alters it to reflect no switches available. This
would lead the mechanism to find no further way to propagate and stop.
More threats exist in the backbone as well.
Seawave depends on OSPF protocol to pass to other LANs, what if an at-
tacker was able to forge the LSD to contain non-existent IP addresses? This
will stop the vulnerability discovery process from reaching further LANs.
Or even worse, the compromise of the LSD would allow the attacker to
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define routers IP addresses that is not necessary part of of the predefined
scope of the mechanism. Likewise with ARP cache stored at routers, a poi-
soned ARP cache can give the attacker the ability to direct the worm to self-
replicate to whatever IP is given as long the target is vulnerable. This would
take the vulnerability mitigation mechanism out of its predefined scope and
would add a malicious intention to its operational procedure.
Detecting new switches and nodes is also threatened by malicious activ-
ity. One scenario would be adding a rogue switch where Seawave would
not be able to deal with. When Seawave probes the rogue switch for CAM
or STP information, the switch would provide misleading response, such
as fake designate bridge, allowing the switch to remain with its directly
connected malicious nodes away from the mechanism’s coverage. Seawave
assumes the topology information to be authentic and has not been altered.
However, if that is not the case, it becomes vulnerable to the same vulner-
abilities the network topology has. This is expected as the mechanism in
its topology dependent nature becomes part of the network, like the proto-
cols operating within the network, not like an independent external security
system.
The simulation results cover different aspects of performance. Node op-
eration and link failures of p = 0.05 and p = 0.01, respectively, have recorded
different results. For example in a network of size 2500 nodes, link failures
were 27 and node operation failures were 131. Further, 85 link failures were
recorded at a network of the size of 8000 nodes and 420 node operation fail-
ures at the same network. Fig. 5.3 shows more results. The time it took the
agent to cover a network of 2500 elements was 3.25 simulation seconds and
4.0s to cover a 5000 network topology. Of course the time is affected by link
and node operation failures, Seawave will wait 0.5s before retrying after a
link or node operation failure. Note that the time reflects the coverage of
the whole network including newly added network devices, that join the
network at simulation second 2.5. Fig. 5.4 shows more results.
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For the topology change detection, which records the time it takes the
propagation mechanism to detect all newly added network devices, it shows
close results. That is because each topology detects almost the same number
of network devices. In a network of the size 3000 it required 0.47s to detect
30 hosts and a switch (with different hosts connected to it) and 0.48s for a
network of the size 8000. More results can be seen at Fig. 5.5. In comparison
with a randomly scanning worm, our mechanism has generated 570 packets
in a network of the size 1500, while the random scanning worm generated
23074 packets. Moreover, the random worm generated 31358 packets to
cover a network of the size 2500 while our scanning algorithm required 912
packets only. Further results are shown in Fig. 5.6.
The random scanning worm has generated too many scans to non-existent
IP addresses. Although the worm operates within the LAN, non-existent IP
scans will cause the host to emit an ARP probe for each new IP address scan-
ning attempt. For a network topology of the size 1500 it resulted in 3660723
non-existent IP scan attempts and 5165367 for a network of size 2500. Re-
sults are shown in Fig. 5.7. Seawave, however, avoids scanning non-existent
IP addresses since it detect targets based on CAM information.
5.9 Summary
We have previously proposed a defensive worm (Seawave I) to help pre-
vent malicious attacks in Chapter 4, and in this chapter we further enhance
its performance. Improvements include: edge node failure recovery to en-
sure sound and efficient coverage of all vulnerable edge nodes and an al-
gorithm to enable the mechanism to traverse the network backbone using
OSPF protocol and ARP stored in routers – which provides independently
driven self-propagation to all network LANs without human intervention
as compared to the previous design.
We also proposed an algorithm to enable the mechanism to detect newly
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added network devices as soon as possible to eliminate vulnerability expo-
sure. Since Seawave is topology dependent, different risks and threats to
topology information have been highlighted, especially protocols utilized
in the discovery process, such as: STP, OSPF, ARP, SNMP, and CAM.
We have validated Seawave through simulations; the results shown here
assumed relatively volatile link failures of probability p = 0.01 and node
operation failure of p = 0.05. The results also showed the time it took Sea-
wave to cover the network, in addition to the time required to detect newly
vulnerable nodes that have just joined the corporate network. Simulation
results of a randomly scanning worm that to some extent mimic the propa-
gation behavior of the Slammer worm have also been gathered to be com-
pared with the vulnerability mitigation mechanism in terms of bandwidth
utilization. Ongoing and future work is focused on increasing both the ro-
bustness and performance of the algorithms in defending the propagation
mechanism against malicious adversaries.
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Chapter 6
An LLDP Based Vulnerability
Mitigation Worm
6.1 Overview
In this chapter we propose a simple defensive worm that traverses the en-
terprise network with only knowledge of the immediate network neigh-
borhood as can be obtained from passive observation of the LLDP proto-
col. This minimizes bandwidth consumption in conjunction with persistent
agents deployed by the traversal to capture transient or intermittently ac-
tive nodes. We also analyze the efficiency of our propagation mechanism
under different topologies, while considering – in our simulations – link,
node, and discovery attempts failures. We also compare the mechanism
with blind vulnerability discovery and Seawave I1.
6.2 Introduction
Seawave depends mainly on the spanning tree protocol, but for networks
that do not support STP, a defensive worm can look for alternative protocols
to get topology information. In this chapter we propose a mechanism for
rapid automated vulnerability discovery and mitigation dissemination us-
ing local knowledge of network topology to both contain propagation and
– more importantly – to reduce communication complexity while retaining
1Although, in this chapter we propose another vulnerability mitigation worm, for the sake of this
thesis, we concentrate our work on Seawave; and leave further improvements of this defensive worm
for future work.
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propagation speed and robustness. Our mechanism utilize the Link Layer
Discovery Protocol to learn about neighboring nodes and self-propagate
gradually until total coverage of the enterprise network.
6.3 Network Topology Model
The topologies considered in this chapter assume a hierarchical structure
as typically found in structured (enterprise) networks; we formally model
these topologies using the Transit-Stub model based on work by Zegura
[113], obtaining hierarchical graphs by composing interconnected transit
and stub domains. The network is developed by initially constructing a
connected random graph then each node is replaced by another randomly
connected graph representing the backbone of the network. Each node in
the backbone is then replaced by a randomly connected graph to represent
a LAN connected to a backbone node. Additional edges are then added
within LANs and backbone with edge probability 0.5 within Local Area
Networks (LANs) and edge probability 0.8 between each pair of backbone
nodes [113]. We assume each node in the topology (including routers) sup-
ports LLDP. Five different topologies were generated. For topologies that
support STP (where Seawave is due to run), we follow the model described
in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.
For more accurate results different numbers and layouts of hierarchical
networks have been designed for simulations. These hierarchical topologies
consist of a backbone with different number of LANs connected to it. The
Drop Tail queue management algorithm has been used as a queuing algo-
rithm. Nodes are connected via a duplex-link where packets can flow in
both directions. The number of nodes vary between 72 to 260 with a link
failure probability of p = 0.01 and node operation failure of p = 0.05. In
each simulation, the initial node triggers the vulnerability discovery mech-
anism by sending a packet of 900 bytes within 0.2 seconds of starting the
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Figure 6.1: Zero-Topology knowledge vulnerability discovery (blind)
6.4 LLDP Based Vulnerability Mitigation Worm
In dynamic networks or networks where the topology is unknown or al-
ways changing it is difficult to achieve efficient coverage . However, with
some limited knowledge of network topology, a vulnerability mitigation
mechanism can find its way through the network in a robust manner. If we
assume that each node in a hierarchical network knows its adjacent nodes
(neighbors), it would be possible for many nodes to avoid probing an al-
ready probed system, which – compared to blind vulnerability discovery –
reduces the traffic load on the network and minimizes processing time.
Our proposed algorithm is a vulnerability mitigation worm, which uti-
lizes information from the data link layer (layer 2 of the OSI model) to recon-
struct topology information found through the Link Layer Discovery Protocol
to detect neighboring nodes and propagate gradually until total coverage of
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Figure 6.2: LLDP Based Vulnerability Mitigation Worm
the enterprise network.
In a fully connected four vertexes graph, such as in Fig. 6.1, each node
will probe its neighbors. For example, if A started probing, it will probe
nodeB,C, andD. NodeB will probe node C andD. Node C will thereafter
probe B and D. Node D will probe its adjacent neighbors C and B. Nodes
afterwards will respond to other probes in a similar way, which results in
six redundant probes and four transaction (assuming equal processing time
for each probing and forwarding step).
However, when the immediate neighbors are known, there will be no
redundant probes and only a single transaction step is required. We note
that the neighborhood information is already provided by the IEEE Link
Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) and can be used to discover adjacent net-
work nodes without incurring additional cost. LLDP is a media indepen-
dent protocol intended to be run on all IEEE 802 LAN stations and to allow an
LLDP agent to learn the connectivity and management information from adjacent
stations. [40]. The mechanism traversing the network takes advantage of
the flexibility of self-replicating and self-propagating programs (agents) to
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distribute the vulnerability discovery process around the network without
regard to network topology. The use of agents enables the mechanism to
capture intermittently active nodes and probe hosts from closer distances,
easing the impact on busy links; for more features see Chapter 2 Section 2.1.
When a node gets probed and an agent is installed it checks to see if there
exist any common neighbors with the probing node, and probes all adjacent
nodes except common neighbors. For example, node A probes the adjacent
node B, then the agent at node B compares its neighbors list N(B) with
A’s neighbors list N(A) and probes {N(B)\N(A)} − {A} to avoid dupli-
cate probes if possible. However, since different nodes can share the same
neighbor it is possible for a node to receive redundant probes or to initi-
ate unnecessary transactions. For example, in Fig. 6.2 when node A initi-
ates agent propagation, there will be two propagation paths. The first path
passes through node C, D, and E, while the other path pass through B and
E. NodeE, therefore, will receive two redundant probes as both paths leads
to E. However, the existence of more than one path to probe a node has the
positive side of the mechanism being able to reach the node even if a spe-
cific path has been blocked. Multiple paths helps in preventing malicious
attempts directed towards stopping the mechanism from propagating, such
as a rogue node that does not react normally to common network behavior.
Furthermore, multiple paths allow the mechanism to avoid missing large
parts of the network when a certain path is not responding positively to
agent propagation (i.e. parts that can not be reached from path A can be
reached by path B). More threats on the mechanism are set for future work.
6.5 LLDP Based Vulnerability Mitigation Defensive Worm
Implementation
Based on LLDP, each node will store a local data base known as Manage-
ment Information Base (MIB) which lists neighbors connected to the node.
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The database can be accessed by requesting LLDP MIB objects using SNMP.
The nodes advertise information about themselves to their neighbors and
collect the information they receive about their adjacent nodes. When a
node needs to learn the list of neighbors of a sender, it accesses the sender’s
MIB through SNMP. When node A probes node B, node B communicates
with node A through SNMP to obtain the list of neighbors, if this informa-
tion is not already retained locally. Regardless of the preceding step, B can
then iterate through the list of neighbors in sequence and probe all neigh-
bors other than common neighbors. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.2 as node
A triggers the mechanism where it starts by reading the station’s neighbors,
which are in this case nodesB andC. When the agent self-replicates to node
B and C both stations will start reading their own neighbors and propagate.
Node B will read A, C, and E and will then read the neighbors list of the
source by requesting the LLDP MIB stored at node A if necessary, obtaining
nodes B and C. B, thereafter, will ignore node A because it is the source
node and will ignore node C because it is a common neighbor between A
and B and will self-replicate to node E. A similar scenario will occur to
node C, where it will self-replicate to node D (ignoring A and B) and then
to node E. Node E, however, will receive two redundant probes that is due
to node E being a common neighbor to two nodes whom are not adjacent
(B and D).
Assuming a node that has received the agent from another node as nreceiver
and the node that sent the agent as nsender. The algorithm can be summa-
rized as follows:
1. Install agent at the starting host n0 in a subnet.
2. Unless nreceiver = n0, if nreceiver is already probed then stop, else con-
tinue.
3. Agent reads nreceiver LLDP Management Information Base objects to
extract adjacent neighbors A.
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4. Agent then reads nsource LLDP Management Information Base objects
to extract adjacent neighbors B.
5. Remove nreceiver and nsender from the lists and compare them and self-
replicate to non-common neighbors, that is {A\B} − {nsource}.
6. Go to step 2
We assume that adjacent neighbors are nodes directly connected to the
sender or receiver nodes. We consider the whole network as N. The agent
propagates through adjacent nodes sets {A0, A1, A2..}whereN = {A0 ∪ A1 ∪ A2..}.
When the intersection of any two sets (whom are not adjacent) is not empty
then redundant probes would occur, that is {A0 ∩ A1} 6= φ
Agents play an important role in achieving sound coverage of the net-
work. When a node is offline it would not appear in LLDP list of adjacent
nodes, allowing the vulnerability discovery mechanism to fail to see the of-
fline node. However, when each agent around the network reads neighbors
list periodically, nodes that go online or offline would be noticed and suit-
able actions can take place. As soon as a node appears online, it announces
itself through LLDP, where an agent will be able to detect it and thereafter
probe it for any vulnerability – assuming the vulnerability mitigation tech-
niques described at Chapter 4 Section 4.5. In addition, agents would help to
address the problem in relation of network dynamics, the existence of links
and disappearance of others. When there is a new segment connected to
the network, as long as LLDP can be read, it can be detected by agents and
thereafter get assessed for vulnerabilities, reducing the time of vulnerability
exposure as much as possible.
To avoid any possible unauthorized alteration of vulnerability discovery
packets, integrity protection measures can be applied. Both message in-
tegrity and authenticity are required to provide secure vulnerability probes;
one way to provide this is by using Message Authentication Codes or MACs,
a symmetric technique that depends on a secret key distributed among com-
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munication entities. It can be derived by block ciphers or cryptographic
hash functions. When the sending and receiving nodes generate a valid
MAC then they can build a secure line of communication. SSL/TLS and
IPSec for example utilize such technique [37]. Each MAC is embedded into
a packet, by running the key against the packet, the receiving node can ver-
ify message integrity and origin.
Figure 6.3: Two network topologies with the same number of nodes (100), but with
different layouts.
6.6 Vulnerability Discovery Mechanism Design
Components
Nazario et al. defined different components that constitute a worm system
[72]. We use their components to describe the design of our LLDP based de-
fensive worm with slight modification. The vulnerability discovery mecha-
nism consist of three components that allow it to cover the network as fol-
lows:
• Reconnaissance. This component is responsible for discovering host
nodes that are vulnerable. Our discovery and propagation mechanism
depends on the information provided by the LLDP protocol to propa-
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gate. Hosts are discovered by looking up the neighboring nodes stored
in the LLDP database.
• Probe Component This component describes the method the mechanism
used to detect the vulnerability at a target node. For the sake of sim-
plicity, our simulation assumed all hosts to be susceptible and it re-
quires only one packet of the size 900 bytes to exploit another node and
we assume vulnerability mitigation techniques as described in Chapter
4 4.5. However, in a heterogeneous network, more elaborate scanning
will be required from agents.
• Communication. This component describes the communication between
agents. The scanning mechanism does not allow communication be-
tween agents at this stage, else for detecting if the node has been probed
more than once.
These three components summarize the design of the vulnerability mit-
igation mechanism; further extensions are to be added in future work.
6.7 Risks and Threats
The vulnerability mitigation mechanism assumes the topology information
to be authentic. However, if that is not the case, it becomes vulnerable to
the same vulnerabilities the network topology has. This is expected as the
mechanism in its topology dependent nature becomes part of the network,
like the protocols operating within the network, not like an independent
external security system.
When a malicious entity compromises a network node, it will have the
ability to alter the LLDP database stored in the system. Which gives the
attacker the force to at least hide the compromised node from the mecha-
nism’s sight; that can be achieved by stopping the node from advertising
its identity. However, even though the compromised node has hidden it-
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self from vulnerability detection, its neighbors most probably have been de-
tected by the mechanism, which leaves the vulnerable node to some extent
isolated in the network. Exceptions exist if the neighbors of compromised
node are only connected to it, which leaves the node and its neighbors vul-
nerable.
When an attacker compromises an agent itself, he can stop the propaga-
tion of the mechanism by deleting the LLDP database providing no further
hosts to scan. However, other agents distributed throughout the network
might be able to cover the vulnerability gap caused by such malicious ac-
tivity. For the attacker to stop the whole mechanism from vulnerability de-
tection he has to compromise each agent, which is a difficult task unless the
malicious user was able to control the agent(s) in the very early stages of
propagation.
6.8 Simulation Results
In order to measure the performance of both the baseline blind scanning and
our proposed vulnerability discovery mechanism, computer network sim-
ulations were used. All simulations have been performed using Network
Simulator 2 (NS-2) [42]. As described in section 6.3, hierarchical networks
were generated to model larger enterprise networks. Two parameters were
considered in simulations: The number of network nodes and different net-
work architectures. In total, there were 300 hierarchical network simula-
tions performed by NS-2. The simulations were grouped into 5 groups each
group consisted of a different quantity of nodes that varied from 72 to 260.
For blind and Seawave mechanisms, 5 different layouts of the same topol-
ogy were generated. Note, blind and LLDP mechanisms were run under
the same topologies, while Seawave was run under topologies that support
STP. In each simulation we have gathered the following:
• The number of link failures under the probability of 0.01.
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• The number of node operations failures under the probability of 0.05.
Node operation failures are failures caused by the node it self (e.g. sys-
tem is busy or in different state due to restarting).
• The number of redundant probes issued by each mechanism. Redun-
dant probes are probes received by a node more than once.
• The actual number of missed nodes during the process of vulnerability
discovery.
The simulations were run at each group and the average result was cal-
culated for better accuracy. Toplogy nodes consisted of router nodes on the
backbone and host machines spreads around the network as LANs.
6.8.1 Worm’s Sensitivity to Network Topology
Although the network structures were similar (backbones and several LANs),
the generation of unnecessary bandwidth (redundant probes) varied heav-
ily among different topologies. For instance running the same simulation
on two different topologies with the same number of nodes (100) generated
two widely different results. The first blind vulnerability discovery simu-
lation resulted in 63 redundant probes on the first topology. The second
simulation on a topology with the same number of nodes resulted in 277
redundant probes. Running our proposed vulnerability discovery mecha-
nism on the same topologies have resulted in 20 and 116 redundant probes
respectively. Fig. 6.3 shows an example of two network topologies of 100
nodes used as part of the simulations. This indicates how sensitive the self-
replicating and self-propagating algorithms are towards the network struc-
ture and how previous knowledge of the network topology would improve
the performance of such algorithms.
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Figure 6.4: Redundant Probes.
6.9 Discussion
Even limited knowledge of network topology can reduce the communica-
tion complexity of self-replicating and self-propagating network approaches
and is crucial in avoiding congestion. Vulnerability discovery cannot use
highly efficient (reliable) broadcast mechanisms as it requires both interac-
tion between entities and recovery from intermittent availability and faults
since the cost of missing nodes in the discovery is disproportionate.
While blind scanning has the potential to achieve very high coverage, the
number of redundant messages particularly on backbones is problematic as
congestion potentially limits service availability and also restricts propaga-
tion speed. For a network of 100 nodes, our proposed mechanism reduced
the number of redundant probes to 34% of the blind probing approach (on
average), while for a 222-node network, the reduction was 36%, as can be
seen in Fig. 6.4. Seawave does not generate redundant probes as it mainly



























Figure 6.5: Node Operation Failure Probability of 0.05
active path to a node. However, the mechanism would generate some over-
head in terms of topology information gathering, as Seawave would com-
municate with neighboring switches to read CAM and STP information to
determine the worm propagation path and requires further recovery traffic
for unavailable nodes.
The main benefit of our proposed LLDP based mechanism is the flexi-
bility of network infrastructure supported and use of information already
present on network nodes. Blind vulnerability discovery has resulted in the
highest amount of link failures under the probability of p = 0.01 or node
operation of p = 0.05 probability failure. That is because blind vulnerabil-
ity discovery consider all links (other than the sender link) and all adjacent
nodes (else sender’s node) in its propagation attempts.
Our algorithm records fewer failures compared to blind vulnerability
discovery as it deals with fewer links and nodes as topology information has
been utilized while, Seawave has the least amount of link and node failure
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Figure 6.6: Link Failure Probability of 0.01
due to the mechanism taking advantage of STP path availability (subject to
delays caused by STP convergence), as shown in Fig. 6.6 and 6.5. Results
of the actual number of missed nodes during vulnerability mitigation of the
three mechanisms are plotted at Fig. 6.7
6.10 Summary
Seawave I is a mechanism that depends mainly on STP information for its
propagation; however, sometimes alternative approaches are needed when
dealing with networks that does not necessary support STP. We have there-
fore, proposed in this chapter, an alternative vulnerability mitigation worm,
that allocates its targets based on information retrieved by LLDP.
The use of LLDP gives the mechanism more flexibility which makes it
more suitable for highly heterogeneous network architectures. We have
compared the mechanism with blind vulnerability scanning and Seawave I















Figure 6.7: Actual Number of Missed Nodes.
the mechanisms failed to cover.
Future work would concentrate on increasing the efficiency and robust-
ness of the mechanism, especially reducing the number of redundant probes
and providing a backbone traversal algorithm along with further protective




Security and Performance Aspects of
Seawave
7.1 Overview
In Chapter 4 and 5, we have tested Seawave within different network topolo-
gies and also compared it to a random scanning worm – bandwidth wise.
In this chapter, however, we release Seawave into the enterprise network
in response to a malicious random scanning worm outbreak. We observe
and evaluate Seawave’s performance and report the results, comparing the
defensive worm against the malicious one demonstrating that network im-
munity can be largely achieved despite a very limited warning interval. We
also discuss mechanisms to protect Seawave against subversion and ensure
the confidentiality and integrity of its communications.
7.2 Network Topology Model and Simulation Environment
Based on the network model previously described in Chapter 5 (Section
5.2), we have generated 5 hierarchical networks with nodes connected via a
duplex-link where packets can flow in both directions, and for the results re-
ported in section 7.5, the number of nodes have been selected between 100
and 500, with link bandwidth set to 100 Mbps and assuming a discovery
packet size of 900 bytes. Fig. 7.1 show an example.
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Figure 7.1: A sample of a network of 100 nodes where a malicious worm and Sea-
wave are operating. Yellow nodes infected (by malicious worm), brown are im-
mune (by Seawave), and red are susceptible.
7.3 Protective Measures for Seawave
Before deploying the vulnerability mitigation mechanism it is important to
add protective measures that would prevent an adversary from compromis-
ing Seawave’s integrity and confidentiality affecting its normal behavior. In
this section we therefore, propose protective measures that should maintain
the stability of Seawave during its operation and in Chapter 8 we provide a
formal threat analysis model of the mechanism.
The defensive worm in its current stage does not provide sophisticated
communication between plotted agents; however, it is crucial to protect the
communication line between agents to block any malicious attempt to feed
agents false information or even overwrite the agent code which might lead
to mechanism’s compromise. Different approaches exist to protect the line
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of communications among Seawave’s agents, including:
Updating Agent Code
In some occasions, the security team of the enterprise network might need
to update the agents around the network to overcome certain threats; how-
ever, many malicious users might utilize any update procedure to inject ma-
licious code within the update to enable the compromise of Seawave. One
protective measure to enable the mechanism to distribute agent updates is
by using digital signatures. When Seawave needs to update its agents, it
signs the update with its private key before deploying it to all agents. Re-
cipient agents, consequently, verify the agent update by running Seawave’s
public key against the binary code and install the new update if it was ver-
ified successfully, otherwise, the update gets rejected. The same approach
has been observed with Conficker where RSA encryption with different key
lengths were used to validate or reject downloads [53]. Key distribution and
management issues should be taken into account when using public key
cryptography to secure agents communication, however, using it only to
validate agent updates from the master node (i.e. the starting node) should
not require extensive key management efforts.
Agent to Agent Communication
Agent to agent communication is needed to maintain Seawave’s operational
level, but there is no requirement to keep the communication between agents
confidential, as it should contain only information that would keep the de-
fensive worm running as expected (such as acknowledgment messages that
an agent has self-replicated successfully). However, the integrity of agent
to agent communication becomes crucial to avoid any malicious attempts
to inject false information or alter packet contents to force the vulnerabil-
ity mitigation mechanism to misbehave and fall out of its normal line of
operation. To provide integrity and authenticity to agent to agent commu-
121
7. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ASPECTS OF SEAWAVE
nication, agents can use a Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm,
provided a secret key is hard coded in all agents. The message runs through
the MAC before it is sent to its destination. The recipient agent verifies the
message using the same key. For better practice the key should be changed
regularly to prevent a malicious user from revealing the key by sniffing a
large amount of traffic.
Agent to Master Node Communication
Since the communication between agents and the master node would con-
tain sensitive information, bound to the sensitivity of the mission Seawave
has been released on, it is crucial to maintain the confidentiality of this line
of communication. Upon communication the agent suggests a symmetric
key to the master node to be used as a session key, which will encrypt all the
traffic between the two nodes throughout the session. The agent encrypts
the session key using the master node’s public key before it is sent. To pre-
vent the malicious user from altering or suggesting the key (in other words
to provide integrity and authenticity) the key is run through the MAC algo-
rithm of the mechanism. Session keys should be generated randomly with a
length that will make it hard for a malicious users to run a brute force attack
against the encrypted traffic.
7.4 Switching Seawave Off
Self-replicating and self-propagating solutions should have the functional-
ity to be switched off or un-installed from the enterprise network in case
something went wrong, or even for administrative or technical require-
ments. Since all agents are linked to a master node, Seawave can include
such functionality in different ways, including:




• If the agent has not received any packets from the the master node
since time t then the agent stop operating and remain dormant.
• Setting a time to live (or age) for Seawave, where the whole mechanism
stops operating after a pre specified time t.
The location and address of each agent should be accessible by the enter-
prise security team through the master node.
7.5 Simulation Results
All simulations have been performed using the Network Simulator 2 (NS-
2), a discrete event simulator mainly used for research activities [42]. Fol-
lowing the model and assumptions outlined in section 7.2, topologies have
been simulated 19 times and average results were calculated to account for
random effects such as link failure probabilities and protocol state updates.
In our simulations we have gathered the following:
• The number of link failures with probability of 0.01.
• The number of node operation failures with probability of 0.05. Note
that node operation failures are failures caused by the node itself (e.g.
system is busy or in different state due to restarting)
• The number of packets generated by Seawave to cover the network
and overcome the malicious worm. The packets that are generated
between a switch and a host are, however, exempted because they have
no significant impact on the bandwidth of the network. The packet size
is 900 bytes.
• The time it takes Seawave to cover the corporate network and con-
tain the malicious worm. Time is measured in simulation seconds and
when there is a link or a node operation failure, the mechanism will
try to recover the failure after 0.5 simulation seconds.
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• The number of nodes infected by the malicious worm.
• The number of failed infection attempts due to the node being immune
(i.e. entered the scope of Seawave)
Both the malicious worm and Seawave will be triggered at second 0.2 of
















































Figure 7.3: Number of failed infection attempts (triggered by the malicious worm)



































Figure 7.5: Number of packets generated by Seawave to cover the network.
7.6 Seawave Packets
During Seawave’s propagation to cover the enterprise network, it commu-
nicates with other network devices using 14 types of packets. Within the
switch domain, an agent communicates with the directly connected switch
to detect directly connected hosts and directly connected neighboring switches.
The agent then communicates with neighboring switches and hosts to prop-
agate until it reaches the backbone where it communicates with the router to
draw the backbone and propagate to other LANs. Communication between
agents and the master node is also necessary for results gathering, updates,
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Figure 7.6: The time it required Seawave to cover the network.
and issuing further instructions. Packets classifications and descriptions uti-
lized by the mechanism to gather topology information and propagate are
summarized in Table 7.1.
7.7 Discussion
Indeed, due to the high speed of malicious worms and the lag between a
vulnerability announcement and code-level patch deployment, it is neces-
sary to have a mechanism ready to intervene when there is a significant
threat to the enterprise network. The self-replicating and self-propagating
nature of Seawave makes it competent to overcome malicious attacks.
When a malicious worm breaks out, it is a challenging task to eliminate
it, despite the ongoing research on detection and early warning [48, 19].
With a noticeable high infection rate due to random scanning the malicious
worm managed to to infect 248 nodes in a hierarchical enterprise network
of 300 nodes. And with a network of 500 nodes, 465 hosts were compro-
mised before Seawave was able to contain them. More infection results are
shown in Fig. 7.2. However, the malicious worm began to encounter failed
infection attempts, as some hosts have already been covered by Seawave





Seawave STP CAM RQ Agent requests STP and CAM information
from the switch.
Seawave STP CAM RPL Reply to agent request of STP and CAM infor-
mation from the switch.
Seawave CAM RQ Agent requests CAM information from the
switches.
Seawave CAM RPL Reply to agent request of CAM information
from the switches.
AgentÖ Host
Seawave SelfReplicate Agent self replicates to host.
Seawave SelfReplicate ACK Acknowledgment of agent self replication.
Seawave Host Probe Agent probe host for vulnerability.
Seawave Host Probe ACK Acknowledgment of agent host probe.
AgentÖ Router
Seawave LSD ARP RQ Agent requests LSD and ARP information from
router.
Seawave LSD ARP RPL Reply to agent request of LSD and ARP infor-
mation from router.
Seawave ARP RQ Agent requests ARP information only from
router.
Seawave ARP RPL Reply to agent request of ARP information
from router.
AgentÖMaster Node
Seawave Agent to Master Agent initiates a request to the master node to
start a line of communication.
Seawave Master to Agent Master node initiates a request to an agent to
start a line of communication.
Table 7.1: Seawave’s Packets Description.
failed malicious infections. And 25893 failed compromising attempts for a
network of the size 400. More results are shown in Fig. 7.3
As in any mechanism, in real world deployment, the mechanism might
encounter failures due to a network link or the node itself is not in a status
to continue operating. For a network of the size 300 there were 16 dissemi-
nation failures due to node operation and about 26 failures for a network of
500 nodes. Network link failures have also occurred; for example 5 link fail-
ures have been observed for a network of the size 500 nodes. Obviously, the
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larger the size of the network the more chance that a link or node operation
failure would occur. More results are shown in Fig. 7.4
Bandwidth wise Seawave was able to eliminate the malicious worm in a
network of the size 300 using 116 packets. A hierarchical network that con-
sisted of 500 nodes required 194 packets to eliminate the malicious worm
and disable the vulnerability in all network nodes. More results are shown
at Fig. 7.5. One of the main challenges in self-replicating and self-propagating
mechanisms is maintaining the bandwidth, it has been observed that Sea-
wave in its task to eliminate the malicious worm and cover the network has
not produced high bandwidth or exhausted network main links, that is due
to the fact that the defensive worm utilizes the network topology to reduce
the bandwidth as much as possible.
The faster the deployment of the security mechanism the narrower the
vulnerability exposure and lesser becomes the risk. The time it took Sea-
wave to respond to the random scanning worm within a network of 300
vulnerable nodes is 1.70 simulation seconds. The time is affected of course
by failures that might happen in the link or the node itself. Seawave re-
covers failures after 0.5 seconds. The enterprise network of 400 nodes in
size has required 2.18 seconds for its coverage. Results are shown in Fig.
7.6. Note, if Seawave was not released promptly, it will be too late for the
mechanism to counter the malicious worm due to network congestion.
The integrity of Seawave becomes crucial when its agents are spread
around the enterprise network. Protective measures, therefore, are neces-
sary to provide confidentiality and integrity while the mechanism operates
within the network. The master node (the first node) uses public key cryp-
tography to protect its communication with agents as described in section
7.3, however, the possibility that the private key becomes compromised by a
malicious user still holds, but it is less likely as it is only one private key the
security team should take care of, which narrows the scope of key manage-
ment. However, the threat of compromise becomes more probable between
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agents as they all share the same secret key for the MAC, a malicious user
who compromise an agent secret key, can communicate between agents in-
cluding the master node and give misfeeds. But such a threat reduces when
the agent is only receiving commands from the master nodes and not issu-
ing them.
7.8 Summary
In this chapter we have highlighted one scenario, where a malicious worm
outbreaks to an enterprise network, to be then confronted by Seawave; which
has succeeded in containing the malicious worm and eliminating its threat.
Using networks that mimic, to a large extent, enterprise networks, simula-
tions of a malicious worm outbreak and Seawave attempts of containments
were implemented. The results covered link and node operation failures,
bandwidth generation, time of coverage, infected nodes, and failed infec-
tion attempts. In all simulation runs, Seawave was able to contain the mali-
cious worm with minimum bandwidth.
We have also highlighted protective measures that the defensive worm
can use to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of its communications.
These measures include using public key cryptography to authenticate agents
updates and exchange session keys with the master node; in addition to,
agents sharing a secret key of the MAC algorithm to ensure the integrity of
operational messages between agents.
Future work is focused on increasing both the robustness and perfor-





Threat Analysis Model of Seawave
Using Bayesian Belief Networks
8.1 Overview
In this chapter we propose a threat analysis model based on Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBNs) to analyze and quantify threats towards Seawave. Based
on several threat scenarios (Section 8.5), the model also determines the risks
posed to the mechanism’s duty of assessment within the enterprise net-
work. The model constructs threats scenarios based on sequenced structure
and also forms a multi-scenario threat BBN, where malicious behaviors are
interdependent and threat performance aspects are adjusted using network
and mechanism specific parameters. Based on predetermined event proba-
bilities within these interdependent structures, threat scenarios likelihoods
and risks are driven.
8.2 Introduction
In Chapter 4 and 5 we proposed our defensive worm Seawave and with dif-
ferent types of threats – especially under complex and dynamic enterprise
networks – it becomes crucial to have a method to assess the mechanism’s
risk. Threat models allow us to prioritize the type of attacks that matters
the most, mitigate Seawave’s risks, discover more attacks [94] and spot the
weakest points within the mechanism to allow for further enhancements.
In this chapter we propose a threat analysis model to identify and quantify
131
8. THREAT ANALYSIS MODEL OF SEAWAVE USING BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS
Stop Agent Propagation





¬E P (¬E|¬F )
¬F
P (¬F )
Figure 8.1: Bayesian Network of Threat Scenario 7 (See A.1.2) of Goal 8.5.2, Tree 1:
Stopping the agent propagation by flooding the network with Seawave SelfRep
licate ACK packets, after compromising Seawave’s MAC algorithm.
threats and risks that malicious intruders might pose towards our vulner-
ability mitigation mechanism. The model is based on Bayesian Belief Net-
works (BBNs), which allows us to compute probabilistic inference of threats
that might target our mechanism. BBNs have four distinctive capabilities as
illustrated by Heckerman [39] and a fifth capability added by Pendharkar,
et al. [78]:
• Handling incomplete data sets,
• Learning casual relationships,
• Combining domain (prior) knowledge and data,
• Avoiding the over fitting of data, and
• Ability of updating the probability distribution.
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These capabilities provide efficient estimates that lead to sufficient manage-
rial decision making based on previous knowledge and subjective proba-
bilistic predictions.
8.3 Related Work
Different models to analyze applications from different perspectives use
Bayesian Belief Networks since they provide a robust inductive reasoning.
Chulani et al. demonstrated few limitations of multiple regression cost mod-
els and how a more sophisticated Bayesian approach would overcome these
limitations. The authors move on to compare and contrast the two models
and conclude that the Bayesian approach is more accurate and robust than
the multiple regression approach [20]. Likewise, Fenton et al. show how
BBNs can support effective risk management decisions compared to tradi-
tional metrics approaches [28, 27], they use a decision-support toolset to
validate their proposal.
Pendharkar et al. proposed a Bayesian model and compared it with other
approaches such as neural network and regression tree. Their results show
how BBNs are more competitive in generating point forecasts, how proba-
bilistic bounds can be set by managers on software effort forecasts, and how
new subjective estimates can be incorporated to the Bayesian model [78].
Although, there is a reasonable amount of literature review on different use
of BBNs in assessing software, it is not easy to allocate a research on risk
assessment methods based on BBNs to identify and analyze casual threats
as also noted by [52].
Foroughi described an intelligent agent that uses bayesian techniques to
learn prior risks factors and asset properties in order to generate point fac-
tors and also adjust its probability distribution based on new results [32],
while Phillips et al. proposed a probabilistic graph-based approach to net-
work vulnerability analysis, which can also analyze risks to network as-
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sets [79] . Kondakci proposed a BBN based causal risk assessment method
(CRAM) to identify and analyze threats and quantify risks associated with
them. CRAM can be used to conduct inductive and deductive reasoning
[52].
8.4 Threat Model Components
Indeed threats come in different types and from various sources, it becomes
necessary to classify threats according to their main objective. Here we di-
vide the threats towards our vulnerability mitigation worm into eight com-
ponents according to the goals adversaries try to achieve:
• A: Malicious Use of Agent to Master Node Communication. Under
this component comes the threats intervening with the communication
line between an agent and the mechanism’s master node.
• B: Malicious Use of Agent to Agent Communication. The malicious
interventions in agent to another agent line of communication are in-
cluded within this component.
• C: Compromise Agent to Switch Communication. The agent commu-
nicates with the switch to retrieve important topology information.
The threats to that line of communication are included under this com-
ponent.
• D: Compromise Agent to Host Communication. When an agent com-
municates with a host node or vice versa, malicious abuse of this com-
munication line is included under this component.
• E: Compromise Agent to Router Communication. When the agent
reads router information for further propagation in the enterprise net-
work, such communication is exposed to different threats included un-
der this component.
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• F: Unauthorized Modification of Agent Code. This component de-
scribes malicious attempts to abuse the code update process within
the mechanism.
• G: Compromising Agent in Host Machine. Attack sequences towards
compromising the agent resident in a network node are included un-
der this component.
• H: Mechanism Information Gathering. Attempts to gather informa-
tion about the mechanism for malicious use are described under this
component.
Next we elaborate on the threat interdependent structure within each
component.
8.5 Mechanism’s Threat based Bayesian Networks
8.5.1 Goal: Malicious Use of Agent to Master Node Communication
1. A: Decrypt the Communication Line Between Master Node and Agent.
1.1 B: Break Asymmetric Encryption.
1.1.1 C: Break Asymmetric Encryption by Brute-force.
1.1.2 D: Mathematically Break Asymmetric Encryption.
2. G: Exhaust Master Node Memory (DoS).
2.1 H: Request Connections to Master Node Based on Reply-Attacks.
2.1.1 I: Sniff Network Traffic for Seawave Agent to Master pack-
ets.
2.1.1.1 J: Compromise a Network Node.
2.1.1.2 N: Plug into the Network.
2.2 K: SYN Flood
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3. L: Feed Malformed Information to Master Node.
3.1 M: Compromise an Agent Node.
8.5.2 Goal: Malicious Use of Agent to Agent Communication
1. A: Stop Agent Propagation - Abnormally.
1.1 B: Send a fake Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet to the agent
(Reply-Attack).
1.1.1 C: Flood LAN with unauthentic Seawave SelfReplicate
ACK packets.
1.1.1.1 D: Compromise the MAC algorithm.
1.2 E: Send back an authentic Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet.
1.2.1 F: Compromise the Selected Vulnerable Node.
2. G: Compromising the MAC algorithm.
2.1 H: Brute-force MAC Key.
2.2 I: Compromise an Agent Node.
3. J: Stop Agent propagation to Next LAN.
3.1 P: Send fake Seawave SelfReplicate ACK to Agent.
3.1.1 K: ARP Cache Poisoning of Router to Point to Compromised
Node.
3.1.1.1 L: Compromise Host Node at Next LAN.
4. M: Capture Agent Code after Self-Replicating to an already Compro-
mised Node.
4.1 N: Flood CAM table with Compromised Host MAC Address.
4.1.1 O: Compromise Host Node.
4.1.2 Q: Plug intruder machine into the target switch.
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8.5.3 Goal: Compromise Agent to Switch Communication
1. A: Redirect Agent Vulnerability Probing to a Compromised Host.
1.1 B: Flood CAM table with MAC Address of rouge host.
1.1.1 I: Compromise Host Node.
1.1.2 J: Plug intruder machine to target switch.
2. C: Generate Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
2.1 D: Form a Loop by Manipulating STP Next Bridge field
3. E: Stop Propagation - Abnormally.
3.1 F: Change STP Next Bridge field to a non existent Address and
Flood CAM table.
4. G: Redirect Mechanism to Next LAN.
4.1 H: Change STP Next Bridge field to point to Router.
8.5.4 Goal: Compromise Agent to Host Communication
1. A: Capturing Exploit code used by Agent to detect Vulnerability.
1.1 B: Compromise Host Machine.
1.2 H: Plug Rouge Host Machine to target Switch.
2. C: Stop Mechanism from Probing Hosts for Vulnerabilities.
2.1 D: Flood hosts with Seawave Host Probe ACK packets.
2.1.1 I: Plug Rouge Host Machine to target Switch.
3. E: Stop Mechanism from Self-Replicating to next Switch.
3.1 F: Flood hosts with Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packets.
3.2 G: Send a Seawave SelfReplicate ACK unicast packet to the
Agent.
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8.5.5 Goal: Compromise Agent to Router Communication
1. A: Stop Mechanism from Propagating or Redirect The propagation.
1.1 B: Feed Malformed OSPF (Link State Database) to Mechanism.
1.1.1 C: Manipulate OSPF Data.
1.2 D: Give Corrupted ARP Table.
1.2.1 E: Manipulate SNMP Data.
2. F: Impersonate a Router.
2.1 I: Modify Switch Next Bridge to Point to impersonator host ma-
chine.
2.1.1 J: Plug impersonator machine to target switch.
8.5.6 Goal: Unauthorized Modification Agent Code
1. A: Compromise Master node Private Key.
1.1 B: Compromise Master Node Machine.
1.2 C: Brute force Private Key.
8.5.7 Goal: Compromising Agent in Host Machine
1. A: Exploiting (root-privilege) Vulnerability in Host Machine
1.1 B: Vulnerability Scanning of target system.
1.1.1 C: Port Scanning Target.
8.5.8 Goal: Mechanism Information Gathering
1. A: Store Mechanism Communication Activity.
1.1 B: Start sniffing agent traffic.
1.1.1 C: When probed record agent IP/MAC.
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8.6 Multiple Adversaries Bayesian Belief Threat Network
This section describes the probability of attacks based on more than one
attacker.
8.6.1 Goal: Halt Mechanism’s Propagation
1. S21: Stop Mechanism From Propagating Over the Backbone.
1.1 S27: Information Gathering of Mechanism activity within the En-
terprise Network.
2. S15: Stop Agent from propagating Beyond the current switch domain.
2.1 S27: Information Gathering of Mechanism activity within the En-
terprise Network.
8.7 Threat BBN Conditional Probabilities
8.7.1 Goal: Malicious Use of Agent to Master Node Communication
1. A : P (A|B) = 0.1, P (A|¬B) = 0.6
1.1 B : P (B|C ∩ D) = 0.01, P (B|C ∩ ¬D) = 0.2, P (B|¬C ∩ D) =
0.01, P (B|¬C ∩ ¬D) = 0.5
1.1.1 C : P (C) = 0.3
1.1.2 D : P (D) = 0.001
2. G : P (G|H∩K) = 0.6, P (G|¬H∩K) = 0.8, P (G|H∩¬K) = 0.5, P (G|¬H∩
¬K) = 0.2
2.1 H : P (H|I) = 0.4, P (H|¬I) = 0.5
2.1.1 I : P (I|J ∩ N) = 0.2, P (I|J ∩ ¬N) = 0.3, P (I|¬J ∩ N) =
0.5, P (I|¬J ∩ ¬N) = 0.1
2.1.1.1 J : P (J) = 0.3
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2.1.1.2 N : P (N) = 0.5
2.2 K : P (K) = 0.7
3. L: P (L|M) = 0.7, P (L|¬M) = 0.1
3.1 M : P (M) = 0.2
8.7.2 Goal: Malicious Use of Agent to Agent Communication
1. A : P (A|B∩E) = 0.3, P (A|B∩¬E) = 0.7, P (A|¬B∩E) = 0.2, P (A|¬B∩
¬E) = 0.5
1.1 B : P (B|C) = 0.5, P (B|¬C) = 0.3
1.1.1 C : P (C|D) = 0.3, P (C|¬D) = 0.5
1.1.1.1 D : P (D) = 0.1
1.2 E : P (E|F ) = 0.3, P (E|¬F ) = 0.005
1.2.1 F : P (F ) = 0.2
2. G : P (G|H∩I) = 0.2, P (G|H∩¬I) = 0.2, P (G|¬H∩I) = 0.2, P (G|¬H∩
¬I) = 0.2
2.1 H : P (H) = 0.2
2.2 I : P (I) = 0.2
3. J : P (J |P ) = 0.6, P (J |¬P ) = 0.2
3.1 P : P (P |K) = 0.5, P (P |¬K) = 0.4
3.1.1 K : P (K|L) = 0.2, P (K|¬L) = 0.4
3.1.1.1 L : P (L) = 0.2
4. M : P (M |N) = 0.5, P (M |¬N) = 0.2
4.1 N : P (N |O ∩ ¬Q) = 0.5, P (N |¬O ∩Q) = 0.5
4.1.1 O : P (O) = 0.2, P (¬O) = 0.8
4.1.2 Q : P (Q) = 0.3
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8.7.3 Goal: Compromise Agent to Switch Communication
1. A : P (A|B) = 0.6, P (A|¬B) = 0.2
1.1 B : P (B|I ∩ ¬J) = 0.5, P (B|¬I ∩ J) = 0.5
1.1.1 I : P (I) = 0.2
1.1.2 J : P (J) = 0.3
2. C : P (C|D) = 0.6, P (C|¬D) = 0.3
2.1 D : P (D) = 0.7
3. E : P (E|F ) = 0.6, P (E|¬F ) = 0.4
3.1 F : P (F ) = 0.7
4. G : P (G|H) = 0.6, P (G|¬H) = 0.3
4.1 H : P (H) = 0.7
8.7.4 Goal: Compromise Agent to Host Communication
1. A : P (A|B∩H) = 0.5, P (A|¬B∩H) = 0.5, P (A|B∩¬H) = 0.5, P (A|¬B∩
¬H) = 0.2
1.1 B : P (B) = 0.2
1.2 H : P (H) = 0.3
2. C : P (C|D) = 0.5, P (C|¬D) = 0.2
2.1 D : P (D|I) = 0.5
2.1.1 I : P (I) = 0.3
3. E : P (E|F∩G) = 0.4, P (E|F∩¬G) = 0.5, P (E|¬F∩G) = 0.4, P (E|¬F∩
¬G) = 0.3
3.1 F : P (F ) = 0.5
3.2 G : P (G) = 0.5
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8.7.5 Goal: Compromise Agent to Router Communication
1. A : P (A|B ∩D) = 0.3, P (A|B¬D) = 0.5, P (A|¬B ∩D) = 0.5, P (A|¬B ∩
¬D) = 0.3
1.1 B : P (B|C) = 0.4, P (B|¬C) = 0.3
1.1.1 C : P (C) = 0.4
1.2 D : P (D|E) = 0.5, P (D|¬E) = 0.3
1.2.1 E : P (E) = 0.4
2. F : P (F |I) = 0.5, P (F |¬I) = 0.3
2.1 I : P (I|J) = 0.5, P (I|¬J) = 0.3
2.1.1 J : P (J) = 0.6
8.7.6 Goal: Unauthorized Modification Agent Code
1. A : P (A|B∩C) = 0.1, P (A|¬B∩C) = 0.2, P (A|B∩¬C) = 0.5, P (A|¬B∩
¬C) = 0.3
1.1 B : P (B) = 0.3
1.2 C : P (C) = 0.1
8.7.7 Goal: Compromising Agent in Host Machine
1. A : P (A|B) = 0.4, P (A|¬B) = 0.1
1.1 B : P (B|C) = 0.5, P (B|¬C) = 0.3
1.1.1 C : P (C) = 0.5
8.7.8 Goal: Mechanism Information Gathering
1. A : P (A|B) = 0.7, P (A|¬B) = 0.1
1.1 B : P (B|C) = 0.5, P (B|¬C) = 0.3
1.1.1 C : P (C) = 0.7
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8.8 Multiple Adversaries BBN Conditional Table
8.8.1 Goal: Halt Mechanism’s Propagation
1. S21 : P (S21|S27) = 0.4, P (S21|¬S27) = 0.2
1.1 S27 : P (S27) = 0.147
2. S15 : P (S15|S27) = 0.6, P (S15|¬S27) = 0.4
1.1 S27 : P (S27) = 0.147
8.9 Attack Scenarios
In this section we will highlight possible attack scenarios that would affect
Seawave’s performance and try to find the mechanism’s weakest points. In
goal 8.5.1 where the attacker tries to compromise the communication line
between the agent and the master node, scenario 1 (See A.1.1) calculates the
possibility of an attacker decrypting the communication line by breaking the
RSA encryption mathematically. However, the lack of practical relevance of
such attacks make them less likely to occur.
In scenario 2 (See A.1.1), the attacker tries to decrypt agent communica-
tion to master node by exhaustive key search, which is also very less likely to
succeed as it requires high computing power that is not available to average
attackers. Both scenarios resulted in 7 × 10−5% and 0.5994% probabilities
respectively. However, in scenario 3 (See A.1.1) Seawave might be weak-
ened if the adversary was able to connect to the enterprise network and
sniff agent to master node communication request packets and thereafter
use them to initiate large amount of Seawave Agent to Master requests
forming a DoS against the master node, limiting its availability. The prob-
ability computed for the attack was 1.05%. Conducting the same scenario,
but using an already compromised network node as in scenario 4 (See A.1.1)
would result in the probability decreasing to 0.27%, that is due to the dif-
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ficulty of compromising a node compared to plugging the adversary node
to the network before initiating the attack. Flooding the master node with
SYN connections has resulted in a probability of 8.82% as computed in sce-
nario 5 (See A.1.1). In an attempt to feed the master node with malformed
data as in scenario 6 (See A.1.1), the adversary compromises an agent node
and starts a line of malformed communication with the master node, such
probability was calculated as 14%.
In the context of malicious use of agent to agent communication 8.5.2,
scenario 7 (See A.1.2) describes the possibility of an adversary succeeding
in stopping Seawave’s propagation by flooding the network with Seawav
e SelfReplicate ACK packets in hope that agents about to propagate re-
ceive the packet and stop. However, such attack require the attacker to com-
promise the MAC algorithm and learn the secret key, which is not straight-
forward; the probability was computed to be 0.8358%.
Scenario 8 (See A.1.2), stops the mechanism by sending an authentic S
eawave SelfReplicate ACK packet to the source agent after the adver-
sary succeeds in compromising the vulnerable node. The intruder needs to
pick the same node, randomly selected by Seawave, which is very unlikely;
the probability calculated for such scenario was 0.378%. The probability of
compromising the MAC algorithm used by Seawave using brute force at-
tack was 3.2% as computed in scenario 9 (See A.1.2) and by compromising
the agent and thereafter extracting the secret key it has resulted to 12.8% as
in scenario 10 (See A.1.2).
The agent can be stopped from propagating to other LANs in the en-
terprise by compromising a host in the LAN and ARP cache poisoning the
router to point to the compromised node. When the agent fetches the ARP
cache of the router it will pick the intruder node and therefore self-replicate
to that already compromised node. The intruder, thereafter, will send back
a Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet to refrain the agent from propa-
gating further. Scenario 11 (See A.1.2) covered this attack with a probability
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of 1.2%. The intruder after compromising a node, can trick the agent to pick
the mac address of the malicious node by flooding the switch CAM table
with the same MAC as the intruder’s. The attacker can, thereafter, capture
the agent code of the mechanism (during self-replicating) as in scenario 12
(See A.1.2), which resulted in a probability of 3.5%.
The intruder might be able to compromise agent to switch line of com-
munication 8.5.3. In scenario 13 (See A.1.3) the intruder can redirect the
agent to probe a rouge host for vulnerability by compromising a host node
and flooding the switch with the MAC address of the rouge node. The prob-
ability of such attack results in 4.2%. Another malicious interaction with the
switch might result in a DoS attack on the mechanism by altering the STP
next bridge field in the switch to point to another switch forming a loop.
The probability of the attack was calculated in scenario 14 (See A.1.3) to be
42%. The intruder can stop the mechanism by altering STP next bridge to
point to a non-existent switch and flooding the CAM with fake MAC ad-
dresses to remove all switch addresses, such attack probability is 42% as in
scenario 15 (See A.1.3). Seawave can be directed to shift to the next LAN
without covering all its current LAN by altering the next bridge field in the
switch to point to the router, forcing the agent to start traversing the en-
terprise network. However, the mechanism will still propagate throughout
switches that exist in the CAM table. Scenario 16 (See A.1.3) highlight this
attack with a probability of 42%.
Within the switch domain, where the agent communicates with host
nodes connected to the same switch, malicious activities are expected 8.5.4.
An intruder compromising a machine can capture the exploit used by the
agent upon probing the vulnerability, however, in general vulnerabilities
addressed by the mechanism would most likely be publicly available ex-
ploits, reducing the impact of the attack. The probability of such activity
resulted in 7% as calculated in scenario 17 (See A.1.4). The intruder might
be able to stop the mechanism from probing host nodes connected to the
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same switch by flooding all nodes within the switch domain with Seawave
Host Probe ACK packets causing the agent to consider host nodes already
probed, while they are not. Probability of this malicious activity occurring
is 7.5% as in scenario 18 (See A.1.4). Inline with the previous technique the
attacker can also stop the agent from propagating to neighboring switches
by flooding host nodes with a Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet to
mislead the agent that it has already self-replicated to next switches. The
possibility of scenario 19 (See A.1.4) was 12.5%. The same scenario can also
occur without flooding by sending a unicast Seawave SelfReplicate A
CK packet to the agent directly, but it requires the intruder to successfully
allocate the agent. The attack probability was 0.5% as in scenario 20 (See
A.1.4).
Agent to router communication has its share of malicious activity 8.5.5,
as an intruder can stop the mechanism from traversing the backbone by
altering the LSD OSPF data (Seawave LSD ARP RPL), e.g. pointing to no
further routers, before it reaches the agent. As in scenario 21 (See A.1.5) the
probability was 2.4%. Manipulating the ARP table of the router (Seawave
ARP RPL) would also cause the intruder to redirect the agent to whatever
IP address provided or even stopping the agent from spreading to other
LANs connected to the same router. This attack probability was 3.6% as
in scenario 22 (See A.1.5). The intruder can also impersonate a router by
modifying STP next bridge field to point to the malicious node which will
act as a router to provide misleading information to the mechanism. The
probability computed was 15% as in scenario 23 (See A.1.5).
In order for the intruder to be able to carry unauthorized modifications
of agent code (8.5.6), he has to locate then compromise the master node,
before exposing the private key, which is used to sign the agent code. The
probability of such attack results in 13.5% as in scenario 24 (See A.1.6). Re-
vealing the private key by exhaustive key search, consumes long time and
require high computing resources, the likelihood of the attack was 1.4% as
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in scenario 25 (See A.1.6).
For the intruder to compromise the agent, as in goal 8.5.7, he has to se-
cure access to the network and locate the agent node before starting port
scanning to identify running network applications on the agent machine.
Then the attacker starts probing his target for vulnerabilities, if there was an
exploitable vulnerability that would grant the intruder with root privilege
then go ahead and exploit to compromise the machine and thereafter the
agent. The probability of the attack was 10% as in scenario 26 (See A.1.7).
Indeed information gathering of a target is one of the crucial elements
of a successful attack. Goal 8.5.8 cover this area, where the likelihood of
an intruder accessing the network and allocating the agent at the current
switch – upon vulnerability probing – before recording and analyzing agent
traffic to allocate the mechanism’s master node is described in scenario 27
(See A.1.8) and has resulted in a probability of 24.5%.
8.10 Seawave’s Threat Model
The approach we have used to assess the security of Seawave is based on
Bayesian Belief Networks. BBN helps us calculate threats and their condi-
tional dependencies, forming a threat scenario that targets the mechanism.
Each threat consists of sub-threats that forms a tree of threats to achieve
a certain malicious goal against the mechanism. These bayesian nets (or
trees) are constructed as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and each node in
the graph, lists the conditional probability table based on the parent node
probability table. Each node can be described as conditionally independent
given its parent nodes. Fig. 8.1 shows a threat scenario BBN (scenario 7, see
A.1.2) that might be launched against Seawave. Threat probabilistic infer-
ence can be drawn for different attack techniques when conditional proba-
bility tables are filled for each node within the threat BBN. By rearranging
the conditional probability formula:
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P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
We get the chain rule, where we can calculate the probability of threat A
taking into account its dependencies:
P (A ∩B) = P (A|B)P (B) (8.1)
Thereafter, by symmetry we get the well known Bayes’ rule:






The notation P (A ∩ B) describes the joint probability of threat A and threat
B and the notation P (A|B) = p means given threat B and everything else is
irrelevant to threat A then the probability of A is p [44]. The Baye’s rule al-
lows us to revisit our estimations of threat A given that we get information
about another threat B. The denominator refers to the marginal (uncondi-
tional) probability of event B; that is B regardless of other events, which




P (B ∩ Ai) =
n∑
i=1
P (Ai)P (B|Ai) (8.3)
In order to compute results, each node in the BBN (or threat tree) should
have a conditional probability table. We have created that table based on
subjective probability driven from work experience and current state of
information. Conditional probabilities of each node are driven based on
the value of their parent nodes. Suppose the set of threats in a BBN is
{T1, T2, . . . , Tn} and Parents(Ti) denote the set of parents of the node Ti in
the same threat BBN, then the joint probability distribution of the BBN can
be calculated by:
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For example, from Eq. (8.4) we can compute the the probability of Fig. 8.1
that is: Stopping the agent propagation by flooding the network with Seawave S
elfReplicate ACK packets after compromising the MAC algorithm, by calcu-
lating the joint probability of the threat BBN:
P (A ∩B ∩ C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F ) =
P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B|C) · P (C|D) · P (D) · P (¬E|¬F ) · P (¬F )
In Appendix A we have constructed several threat scenarios that might pose
harm to Seawave. These threats are grouped to achieve certain malicious
tasks under pre specified goals (see section 8.4). The conditional tables of
these threat networks are described in section 8.7, where we can derive
probabilistic inference for each BBN. For example, if we observe threat sce-
nario 7 (See A.1.2) we calculate the probability of this threat taking part to
be 0.8358%, this result is based on providing evidence (findings) for each
node in the threat BB network. But what if we are interested in comput-
ing the probability of threat B taking place within the network regardless
to other threats (i.e. unconditional probability). From Eq. (8.3) to calcu-
late the marginal probability of threat B (P (B)) (8.5.2) that is the probability
of a fake Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet reaching the mechanism’s
agent, we first calculate P (C) based on the conditional table 8.7.2.
P (C) = P (C|D)P (D) + P (C|¬D)P (¬D) = (0.3 · 0.1) + (0.5 · 0.9) = 0.48
Note D is a root node (has no parents) and therefore P(D) equals the condi-
tional probability in the table. Now we are ready to calculate P (B) :
P (B) = P (B|C)P (C) + P (B|¬C)P (¬C) = (0.5 · 0.48) + (0.3 · 0.52) = 0.396
Therefore, the unconditional probability of threat B taking place is 39.6%.
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Figure 8.2: Seawave Bayesian Belief Threat Network 8.5.2 (Tree 1) without provid-
ing any evidence (Netica screenshot).
Fig. 8.2 shows event A (8.5.2) BBN without entering any evidence. How-
ever, one of the benefits of BBNs is the ability to revisit the probabilities
upon new evidence. For example, suppose that we do not know that there
was any flooding of an unauthentic Seawave SelfReplicate ACK pack-
ets within the LAN (event C 8.5.2), but we do know that the agent has
received a forged Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet (event B 8.5.2).
Providing the evidence that event B is true, then using Bayesian theorem
Eq. (8.2), we can determine the revised probability that there was flooding:
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Therefore the observation that the agent has actually received a forged S
eawave SelfReplicate ACK packet (event B is true), has increased the
probability that the LAN has been flooded by an unauthentic Seawave Se
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Figure 8.3: Threat Analysis Model of Seawave.
8.10.1 Constructing The Threat Analysis Model
Based on this we construct a threat analysis model to determine the secu-
rity risks towards Seawave as shown at Fig. 8.3. The model divides threat
scenarios into different groups and applies certain mechanism or network
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parameters to address performance aspects of the malicious attack. These
parameters adjust the ability of the malicious attacker to:
• Allocate the Master Node: α
• Recognize and generate Seawave’s traffic: β
• Manipulate STP and CAM topology information: γ
• Manipulate OSPF and ARP topology information: δ
• Allocate Seawave’s Agent: 
• Sniff traffic in a switched network: ζ
• Secure access to enterprise network (global parameter): ι
In the model we consider each threat scenario as an independent event, that
is P (S1|S2) = P (S1). We, therefore, calculate the joint probability of each
goal using the multiplication rule:
P (S1 ∩ S2) = P (S1) · P (S2)





P (Si); P (Si) ∈ {A,B...H}, p ∈ {α, β, γ, δ, , ζ} (8.5)
The parameter ι which addresses the possibility of an attacker securing ac-
cess to the enterprise network is a global parameter and therefore applies
to all attack scenarios. To see how these threat scenarios affects Seawave,
we define a weight and risk value for the asset targeted, inspired by [52]
with slight modification. We assume asset weight value w range from 0 to
3 and risk value 0 ≤ R ≤ 3 to identify different risk levels: Low {0.0 - 1.0},
Medium {1.1 - 2.0}, and High {2.1 - 3.0}. The risk to the vulnerability miti-
gation mechanism is therefore calculated by:
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R = w · [P (A), P (B) . . . P (H)] · ι; (R,w) ∈ [0, 3] (8.6)
Which will compute the risk considering all possible threats towards the
enterprise network. Not all threats should be considered, few threat sce-
narios and the risk they pose to the mechanism can be computed the same
way. For example, assuming asset weight w = 3 and network or mechanism
parameters β = 0.7, γ = 0.6,  = 0.6, and ι = 0.9 to calculate the risk of a ma-
licious intruder compromising the MAC algorithm by controlling the agent
itself (scenario 9, see A.1.2), while another intruder forming a DoS attack
on Seawave by manipulating STP next bridge field in the switch (scenario
14, see A.1.3) and another trying to stop Seawave from propagating over
the network backbone by manipulating the ARP table stored in the router
(scenario 22, see A.1.5), we compute:
P (S9) · P (S14) · P (S22) · w · β · γ ·  · ι =
(0.032) · (0.42) · (0.036) · (3.0) · (0.7) · (0.6) · (0.6) · (0.9) = 0.0329%
Which results in a low level risk to the enterprise network.
8.10.2 Multiple Attack Scenarios
Figure 8.4: Bayesian Belief Threat Tree 8.6.1 without providing any evidence.
As we have constructed BB networks from single threat elements to form
a threat scenario, in the same manner, we build a BB network that consists
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of threat scenario elements to form a multi-scenario threat to Seawave. We
show how multiple adversaries try to put a halt to Seawave’s propagation.
Adversaries try to gather information about the mechanism, by sniffing traf-
fic based on Goal 8.5.8 and as computed by Scenario 27 (See A.1.8); this sce-
nario, however, is not limited to detecting the master node only, but also
any type of useful information that adversaries may be able to sniff. Based
on the information gathered, adversaries try to block the agents from prop-
agating within their switch domain as described in scenario 15 (See A.1.3)
and prevent the mechanism from moving forward over the enterprise back-
bone as described in scenario 21 (See A.1.5) , placing the mechanism into
halt. Fig. 8.4 shows the multi-scenario BBN attack without entering any
evidence, where scenario 15 and 21 (See A.1.3 and A.1.5 respectively) are
conditionally independent given threat scenario 27 (See A.1.8). And the
probabilities of the attack can be revisited using Bayesian theorem. For ex-
ample suppose that we know that the mechanism has been blocked from
traversing the backbone, that is scenario 21 (See A.1.5) was successful, but
we do not know if there was any information gathering activity beforehand.
Using Eq. (8.2) we compute:






The result indicates that based on the evidence that Seawave was blocked
from traversing the enterprise network, the probability of information gath-
ering activity held beforehand has risen from 0.147 up to 0.26. The marginal
probability of S21 at Fig. 8.4 was driven using a BBN tool of inference Netica
Toolset [76] and it can be computed the same way as we have shown pre-
viously (8.3). Assuming all events are true, the probability of adversaries
succeeding in their attack to put the mechanism’s propagation into halt is




Using Bayesian Belief Networks, we proposed a threat analysis model to
identify and quantify the threats that may occur against Seawave, combined
with techniques to calculate the risk these threats may present. We have di-
vided threats into different components to identify the goals attackers may
try to achieve and designed threat scenarios (or bayesian networks) of sev-
eral malicious penetrating attempts and also formed a multi-scenario threat
BBN.
Several parameters (α, β, γ, δ, , ζ and ι) were used for attack perfor-
mance aspects, most of them are specific to the component and another (ι)
is general for the whole model. It turns out that using BBNs is very useful
in building sequenced threat structure against a specific mechanism, where
probabilistic inference of these threats can be driven.
The model allowed to examine and identify weak points in Seawave’s
configuration where an adversary can take advantage of. It also gave us the
ability to predict the likelihood of a malicious attack taking place through
these weak points; forming sound casual relationships between different




Seawave – A Mathematical
Propagation Model
9.1 Overview
In Chapter 4 and 5, we have tested Seawave under small to medium size
enterprise networks only; that is because event-driven network simulations
consumed a large amount of CPU power, memory, and time making it be-
yond our capacity to test Seawave under large scale enterprise networks.
In this chapter, we propose and analyze an analytical propagation model
of our vulnerability mitigation worm (Seawave). The model takes into con-
sideration the topology structure of enterprise networks such as switches,
LANs, and backbone. The model also addresses the defensive worm’s de-
lays due to CAM table reading (α), neighbor switch communication (β), and
backbone mapping (). We also propose a bandwidth model to measure traf-
fic generation within different stages of propagation. Different simulations
of different hierarchical topologies of enterprise networks have been driven
to further evaluate and observe Seawave’s performance in large scale net-
works.
9.2 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose and analyze a propagation model of Seawave.
We have proposed Seawave in previous chapters, however, although run-
ning topology sensitive mechanisms is better on an event driven simulator
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– as it does not require the topology to be pre-deterministic, which is closer
to real world networks, – these types of simulations are time and comput-
ing power consuming, which restricted Seawave to run on small to medium
size enterprise networks. In this chapter, however, we study how the vul-
nerability mitigation worm propagates on large scale enterprise networks
and analyze its stage by stage propagation before evaluating its overall
performance. We also propose a bandwidth generation model to measure
the amount of traffic generated by Seawave during its gradual propagation
within a pre-deterministic network. In our study we take into consideration
the delays of reading Content-Addressable Memory (CAM) table, Spanning
Tree Protocol (STP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and Open Shortest
Path First (OSPF) topology information.
9.3 Related Work
The field of worm propagation modeling is not new; many models exist to
progress the understanding of computer worms and how they behave. This
understanding helps in designing future countermeasures that reduce or
prevent the impact of malicious worms. Based on the Kermack-Mckendrick
epidemic model, Zou et al. derive a Two-Factor Worm Model (TFWM)
which simulates Code Red worm behavior. The two factors considered are
the dynamic countermeasures applied by users and ISPs, as well as, the
reduction in the worm’s infection speed due to network congestion [116].
More modeling attempts of Code Red were proposed by Staniford et al. and
Moore et al. [93, 64].
Castaneda et al. proposed an architecture to generate a benign worm,
which acts as an active vaccination mechanism that transforms a malicious
worm into a benign worm that propagates the same way as the original
worm [18]. While, different Internet worm propagation models – as intro-
duced by Zou et al. – have been analyzed under different scanning strate-
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gies, including: Idealized, Uniform, Divide-and-Conquer, local preference,
and other scans [117].
The Passive Worm Propagation (PWP) model was proposed by Zhou et
al. to study and analyze passive propagation techniques and its feasibility
to represent a benign worm[115]. While, Fang et al. explored worm vaccina-
tion to counter malicious worms by proposing and analyzing three vaccina-
tion models: Running-Vacc, Noreboot-Vacc, and Reboot-Vacc [110]. In the
same direction, Toutonji et al., proposed a Passive Worm Propagation Quar-
antine (PWDQ) model, which describes a method to stop malicious worms
by recovering infected hosts either by dynamic quarantine or passive be-
nign worms techniques [101].
These models, however, do not take into consideration local topology
preferences; few models briefly consider network devices such as the Three
Layer Worm Model proposed by Su et al., which is based on the Simple Epi-
demic Model (SEM) and the TFWM under NAT environment. The first, sec-
ond, and third layers in the model represent hosts and routers, NAT hosts,
and hosts under each NAT respectively [96]. But, in general, few propaga-
tion models consider the internal structure of the network, that is because
many researchers look at the overall view of a worm propagating over the
internet – crossing large number of interconnected networks. Therefore,
from their prospective it becomes not necessary to go deep in the network
architecture. That, however, does not apply to Seawave as it only operates
under enterprise networks.
9.4 Epidemic Model Introduction
Indeed many techniques in the computer science field have been inspired
by biology and computer worm modeling is not an exception. The way
computer viruses and worms propagate are similar to their counterparts in
biology. An epidemic model attacking different individuals simultaneously
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can describe malicious worms propagation behavior. This section briefly in-
troduces three epidemic models that pave the ground for Seawave’s propa-
gation model. The terminology used in these three models is as follows:
• I(t): The number of infectious nodes at time t.
• S(t): The number of susceptible nodes at time t.
• N: Total number of targeted nodes (the size of the scope).
• η: Average scanning rate.
9.4.1 Simple Epidemic Model in a Homogeneous System
In this model nodes are of two states either infectious I(t) or susceptible [N
- I(t)] and when a node is infected it remains infectious and does not get
removed. As the system is homogeneous each node has equal probability




= ηI(t)[N − I(t)] (9.1)
At t=0 there are I(0) infectious nodes and the rest [N - I(0)] are susceptible.
9.4.2 Flash Worm
Perhaps one of the fastest worms – as target addresses are already known
– Staniford et al. have introduced what they termed as Flash Worm [93].
The worm extends the technique of sized hit-list to cover the whole scope
saving the worm the effort of vulnerability scanning and allocating its vic-







I(t)[N − I(t)] (9.2)
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They showed that without considering delay and with N = 360,000, η =
358/min, and I(0) = 10 the flash worm can infect 99% of its targets at T =
2.23 seconds.
9.4.3 Perfect Worm
Faster than the Flash worm comes the perfect worm; proposed by Zou et al.
as the fastest propagation worm. The perfect worm – where our propaga-
tion model is based – knows all its targets like the Flash worm, however, the
infected nodes cooperate with each other such that there are no reinfections




 ηI(t); I(t) < N,0; I(t) = N (9.3)
Assuming the worm starts with I(0) infected nodes, the analytical solu-
tion becomes:
I(t) = min[I(0)eηt, N ]. (9.4)
9.5 Seawave Propagation Model
In this section we will propose an analytical propagation model of Seawave.
Since Seawave does not infect but rather vaccinate vulnerable nodes from
potential and present malicious attacks, we provide a slightly different ter-
minology than common epidemic terminology:
• V(t) The number of vaccinated nodes at time t.
• A(t) The number of Agent nodes at time t.
• S(t) The number of susceptible nodes at time t.
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• P(t) The number of packets generated at time t. Excluding within
switch bandwidth.
• L(t) The network topology level of operation at time t – the front line
of propagation.
• Switch(L(t)) Number of switches at level L(t).
• N Size of the switch (i.e. the number of nodes connected to the switch).
• LAN The list of LANs within the enterprise network.
• K Number of LANs in the enterprise network.
• η Average scanning rate within a switch.
In the model there are three states of the node:
• Agent: A node becomes an agent, when another agent node self-replicates
to it. An agent node is responsible of further propagation to neighbor-
ing switches and vaccinating other susceptible nodes within the same
switch.
• Vaccinated: A node that has been vaccinated by an agent node.
• Susceptible: A node that is vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Agent and vaccinated nodes continue to remain in their state during the
propagation. Since Seawave depends on the topology of the network for its
propagation we have to specify the topology characteristics; the enterprise
network consists of K LANs each LAN is of the size LAN1, LAN2, .., LANK
respectively. We mean by LAN size, the number of interconnected switches.
Seawave propagates gradually level after level, from switch to neigh-
boring switches and further; Fig. 9.1 illustrates what we mean by levels. We
assume the following for the model:
• All nodes are susceptible.
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Figure 9.1: Enterprise Network Example
• The topology implements the Spanning Tree Protocol.
• All switches are of fixed size N .
We also assume that Seawave initially covers LAN1 starting from the
first level L(t) = 1, before propagating to other LANs within the enterprise
network. Upon covering LAN1 agents self-replicate to other LANs simulta-
neously and propagate until all LANs are covered.
Since the vaccination process is within the switch, this gives the agent
the ability to vaccinate all nodes connected to the switch as soon as it learns
their Media Access Control (MAC) addresses retrieved from the CAM table.
This can be modeled by (9.3), since agents know all their targets and do not
do any revaccination, see Figure 9.2. Let tsf denote the time needed for the
agent to vaccine all nodes connected to the switch, such that V (tsf ) = N ;
based on (9.4) the number of vaccinated nodes in level L(t) = 1 (the initial
switch) is therefore:
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Figure 9.2: Within Switch Vaccination
V (t) = min[I(0)eηt, N ]; t ≤ tsf (9.5)
Without considering network delays, the start time for Seawave to propa-
gate to level L(t) can be derived by:
LT (t) = tsf · (L(t)− 1); t > tsf (9.6)
Since the mechanism covers the enterprise network level by levelL(t0), L(t1),
L(t2) . . . L(tnf ) we derive L(t):
L(t) = dt/(tsf + α + β)e (9.7)
Where α and β are delay parameters described later in this section. Since
all agents start vaccination on the same level L(t) in parallel, then based on
(9.6) and (9.7) the number of vaccinated nodes on L(t) only, can be obtained
by:
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Switch(L(t)) · V (t− LT (t)) (9.8)
Let tnf denotes the total time to cover the whole enterprise network the total




Switch(i); t ≤ tnf (9.9)
Adding both (9.8) and (9.9) gives us the number of vaccinated nodes beyond
the first level L(t) > 1 :
Switch(L(t)) · V (t− LT (t)) +N ×
L(t)−1∑
i=L(t0)
Switch(i); tst < t ≤ tnf (9.10)




Switch(i); t > tnf (9.11)




min[I(0)eηt, N ]; t ≤ tsf
Switch(L(t)) ·min[I(0)eη(t−LT (t)), N ]
+N ×∑L(t)−1i=L(t0) Switch(i);
tst < t ≤ tnf
N ×∑L(tnf )i=L(t0) Switch(i); t > tnf
(9.12)
We also can compute the number of agent nodes scattered around the en-




Switch(i); t ≤ tnf (9.13)
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And the number of susceptible nodes at time t, can be derived by subtract-
ing the number of vaccinated nodes from the total number of nodes in the
whole network:
S(t) = (N ×
L(tnf )∑
i=L(t0)
Switch(i))− V (t) (9.14)
However, the propagation model (9.12) does not consider the following time
delays during propagation:
1. Time for the agent to fetch the CAM table from the directly connected
switch (α).
2. Time for the agent to fetch CAM tables and STP information from
neighboring switches and self-replicating to nodes in neighboring switches
(β).
3. Time for the agent to fetch ARP and OSPF information from routers
in the backbone and self-replicating to other LANs in the enterprise
network ().
Since these delays occur on different stages of the propagation, then the
delay within the start switch at L(t) = 1 is:
t− α; t ≤ tsf where V (t− α) = 0,∀t < α (9.15)
Assuming that the time to cover LAN1 is tLAN1, the time during different
propagation levels within LAN1 becomes:
t− [L(t) · α]− [(L(t)− 1) · β]; tsf < t ≤ tLAN1 (9.16)
And up to tnf the propagation time after delays becomes:
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t− [L(t− ) · α]− [(L(t− )− 2) · β]− ; tLAN1 < t ≤ tnf (9.17)





t ≤ tsf where V (t− α) = 0; ∀t < α,
t− [L(t) · α]− [(L(t)− 1) · β];
tsf < t ≤ tLAN1,
t− [L(t− ) · α]− [(L(t− )− 2) · β]− ;



















LAN 1 LAN 2
Figure 9.3: Two LANs of the same number of switches and links but different time
coverage.
9.5.1 Network Topology Model
Topology dependent self-replicating self-propagating mechanisms are sen-
sitive to network topologies (see Chapter 6, Section 6.8.1), as they define
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their propagation path based on topology information they self-discover
during their gradual dissemination. As it shows in Fig. 9.3, Seawave will
require more time to cover LAN2 compared to LAN1, although both layouts
have the same number of switches and links. Therefore, it is necessary to de-
fine the enterprise network in detailed manner for the propagation model to
utilize. However, it is not feasible to construct non-deterministic topologies,
as due to their unpredictable nature they would require large quantities of
topology descriptions. Therefore, it is more feasible to construct topologies
of a specific layout for the propagation model to walk through and to ease
the task of resolving Switch(L(t)). Below are characteristics of topologies
we have used:
1. Each switch has two neighbors, except edge switches.
2. Each router in the backbone connects at most two LANs.
Fig. 9.1 shows an example of a topology of such characteristics. Based on
these attributes, we can calculate the total number of levels Seawave go
through to cover the whole enterprise network:
dlog(LAN1)e+ dlog(max[LAN − {LAN1}])e (9.19)
While, the number of switches just before the last level of LAN1 can be com-
puted by:
2L(t)−1; L(t) < dlog(LAN1)e (9.20)
Further, the number of switches of the last propagation level of LAN1 (edge
level) becomes:
LAN1 − (2blog(LAN1)c − 1); L(t) = dlog(LAN1)e (9.21)
168
9.5 SEAWAVE PROPAGATION MODEL
One level further leaves us with switches equal to the number of LANs else
LAN1:
K − 1; L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e = 1 (9.22)
When Seawave bypasses the backbone and passes the first level after LAN1
but does not reach an edge level of LANi, the number of switches becomes:
K∑
i=2
2(L(t)−dlog(LAN1)e−1); L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e < dlog(LANi)e (9.23)




LANi − (2blog(LANi)c − 1); L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e = dlog(LANi)e (9.24)
Of course, number of switches becomes 0 when L(t) is beyond the scope of
Seawave:
0; L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e > dlog(LANi)e (9.25)
Based on (9.20), (9.21), (9.22), (9.23), (9.24), and (9.25) we can compute the
number of switches at different propagation levels:




LAN1 − (2blog(LAN1)c − 1);L(t) = dlog(LAN1)e,
K − 1;L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e = 1.
(9.26)
(2) Seawave’s propagating from (L(tLAN1) + 1) upto L(tLANnf ):
When t > tLAN1 + + (tsf + α + β)
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2(L(t)−dlog(LAN1)e−1);L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e < dlog(LANi)e,
LANi − (2blog(LANi)c − 1);L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e = dlog(LANi)e,
0;L(t)− dlog(LAN1)e > dlog(LANi)e.
(9.27)
Now as we have defined Switch(t), we are ready to run our simulations.
9.5.2 Seawave Bandwidth Model
Following bandwidth and communication assumptions in Chapter 5, if we
denote R as the number of routers in the backbone, then the total number
of packets generated by Seawave to cover the whole enterprise network can
be derived by:
P (tnf ) = 4× [(
K∑
i=1
LANi)−K] + 2×R + 2× (K − 1) (9.28)
However, to derive the bandwidth based on time t, we have to take into con-
sideration the levels of propagation Seawave goes through. Within LAN1
the amount of bandwidth can be computed by:
(2L(t) − 2)× 4; tsf < t ≤ tLAN1 (9.29)




Switch(i))−K] + 2×R + 2× (K − 1); tLAN1 < t ≤ tnf (9.30)
We ignore packets generated within the switch as they do not have a signifi-
cant impact on network main links; therefore, packets within the first switch





0; t ≤ tsf ,
(2L(t) − 2)× 4; tsf < t ≤ tLAN1,
4× [(∑L(t)i=L(t0) Switch(i))−K] + 2×R
+2× (K − 1); tLAN1 < t ≤ tnf .
(9.31)




































Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 9.4: Curve Description of a small six level network as in Fig. 9.1
9.6 Simulation Results
After defining the propagation and the bandwidth models, we are ready
to run our simulations using Matlab [59]. It is, however, useful to describe
Seawave’s curve for more clarity. Fig. 9.4 shows a simple curve of the net-
work example provided at Fig. 9.1, we have plotted the delays for better
readability. Notice the waves in the curve are the result of level by level
propagation. At the very start of the curve only α is applied, as Seawave
still operate within the first switch at L(t) = 1; after which it moves to the
next level (L(t) = 2), where α + β are applied to include neighbor switch
communication, and so on. And when Seawave reaches the backbone, the
delay  is applied before propagating to all other LANs within the enterprise
network at L(t) = 4 and it continues until the whole network is covered at
L(t) = 6.
Assuming η = 23 and I(0) = 1, we run Seawave on different network
topologies, with different number of switches, LANs, and delays. We also
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(b) Seawave Bandwidth
Figure 9.5: Network of 10,000 nodes distributed among 4 LANs with inside switch,
switch to switch, and backbone delays.
show the amount of bandwidth generated on these topologies. In a network
of 10,000 vulnerable nodes distributed among 4 LANs and 417 switches, the
time required to cover the whole network was 2, 3.2, and 4.7 seconds based
on α = 0 β = 0  = 0, α = 0.005 β = 0.05  = 0.5, and α = 0.05 β = 0.1
 = 0.8, respectively; and the bandwidth generated was 1662 packets, see
Fig. 9.5a and 9.5b for more details. In a network of 2084 switches (50,000
nodes) distributed among 12 LANs, based on the previous delays the time it
took to cover the network was 2.5, 3.96, and 5.87 seconds, respectively, with
a bandwidth of 8322 packets; more details can be found in Fig. 9.6. Another
network of 21 LANs and 6250 switches (150,000 nodes) has required 2.86,
4.36, and 6.46 seconds on the same delays. The same network has required
24978 packets to become covered, more results are given in Fig. 9.7.
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(b) Seawave Bandwidth
Figure 9.6: Network of 50,000 nodes distributed among 12 LANs with inside
switch, switch to switch, and backbone delays.
The time observed to cover a network of 500,000 nodes and 20834 switches
distributed among 70 LANs with different delays was 2.86, 4.36, and 6.46
seconds respectively. The same network consisted of 20 levels and gener-
ated 83264 packets bandwidth, further details can be viewed at Fig. 9.8.
Then we finally run Seawave on a one million node network connected to
41668 Switches and 140 LANs forming 18 levels of propagation; the time
observed to cover the whole enterprise network was 2.52, 3.91, and 5.82 sec-
onds respectively. And it took 166530 packets to cover the network.
9.7 Discussion
Indeed network topologies and structures affect the way how Seawave prop-
agates, as its self-discovery nature binds it to the topology information grad-
173
9. SEAWAVE – A MATHEMATICAL PROPAGATION MODEL























LAN1 ! 21 = [625,400,500,330,555,432,476,240,142,94,237,77,120,350,424,200,167,325,321,115,120
 
 
" =0, # = 0, $ =0
" = 0.005, # = 0.05, $ = 0.005
" = 0.05, # = 0.1, $ =0.8
Student Version of MATLAB
(a) Seawave Propagation



















LAN1 ! 21 = [625,400,500,330,555,432,476,240,142,94,237,77,120,350,424,200,167,325,321,115,120]
 
 
" =0, # =0, $ =0
" = 0.005, # = 0.05, $ = 0.5
" = 0.05, # = 0.1, $ = 0.8
Student Version of MATLAB
(b) Seawave Bandwidth
Figure 9.7: Network of 150,000 nodes distributed among 21 LANs with inside
switch, switch to switch, and backbone delays.
ually revealed during its propagation. That is why it is more accurate to test
such mechanisms with an event driven simulator (such as NS2 [42]) as you
can run these types of systems on different non-deterministic topologies –
which have been done in Chapter 4 and 5. However, these types of simula-
tors consume high amount of memory and CPU power which makes run-
ning Seawave on large enterprise networks very time consuming. There-
fore, an analytical propagation model is needed to measure Seawave’s per-
formance on very large networks.
Running the mechanism on a network of 7 levels and 500 nodes (21
Switches), yields 1.76 seconds time coverage under parameters α = 0.005,
β = 0.05,  = 0.5, which is very close to the time coverage observed us-
ing a discrete-event simulator, which was 1.86 seconds on a 500 node net-
work (see Chapter 7). During simulations we have observed that the po-
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Figure 9.8: Network of 500,000 nodes distributed among 70 LANs with inside
switch, switch to switch, and backbone delays.
sition where the first agent is located does affect the propagation speed, as
the closer the agent is to the backbone router the sooner Seawave spreads
around the enterprise network. That is because the mechanism becomes
able to draw the network map based on the information retrieved from the
backbone routers in the early stages of propagation. Therefore, for faster
propagation the security team might consider installing the starting agent
on the switch directly connected to the router, or as a possible future im-
provement of Seawave, the agent could try to detect the default router and
start mapping the backbone as early as possible.
It has been observed that the smaller LAN1 is the faster the propagation
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Figure 9.9: Network of 1000,000 nodes distributed among 140 LANs with inside
switch, switch to switch, and backbone delays.
– for the same previous reasons (i.e. closer to the backbone). Not smaller in
the number of nodes but in propagation levels; as Seawave is affected more
by the levels of propagation rather than number of nodes, that is due to the
nature of self-replicating to all switches on the same level leading the vacci-
nation process to becoming simultaneous. We can see this clearly in Fig. 9.8
(500,000) and Fig. 9.9 (one million) which resulted in 4.36 and 3.91 seconds
time coverage respectively – based on the exact parameters. Although both
networks maintain a 50% number of nodes difference, the 500,000 nodes
network had 20 levels compared with the one million node network which
only had 18 levels from the prospective of Seawave. Even if the number of
levels is the same, the position where Seawave starts propagating impacts
its general behavior, producing different performance results depending on
176
9.8 SUMMARY





















LAN1 ! 4 = [100, 200, 300,500]
 
 
" =0, # = 0.1, $ = 0.8
Student Version of MATLAB
(a) LAN1→4 = 100, 200, 300, 500




















LAN1 ! 4 = [500, 300, 100, 200]
 
 
" = 0.05, # = 0.1, $ = 0.8
Student Version of MATLAB
(b) LAN1→4 = 500, 300, 100, 200
Figure 9.10: Two different curves of the same network, but with different Seawave
start points.
the start point of propagation. We can see this in Fig. 9.10a and 9.10b which
shows different curves of the same network, however, with different start-
ing points (LAN1 = 100 and LAN1 = 500). And it shows different time
coverage, due to different propagation levels, as based on (9.19) it took Sea-
wave 16 levels to cover the network starting at LAN1 = 100 as in Fig. 9.10a
and 18 levels to cover the same network starting at LAN1 = 500 as in Fig.
9.10b.
9.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a propagation model of our vulnerabil-
ity mitigation worm named Seawave. In the model we have considered the
small details of a network structure such as the number of switches, LANs,
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and backbone. Also we have considered the delays to vaccine switch nodes
(α), self-replicate to neighboring switches (β), and bypass the network back-
bone (). We have also proposed a bandwidth model to measure the amount
of traffic generated, in addition to, defining a network topology model to
run under.
We have run Seawave on networks of different sizes starting from 10,000
to one million nodes and we have spotted some potential improvements to
the mechanism, such as adding the agent capability to probe for the back-
bone router during early stages of propagation. And we have observed how
the starting position affects the performance and how network levels influ-





In this thesis we have revised our prejudgments towards computer worms
and tried to reassess their capabilities, however not as a malware, but as
a vulnerability mitigation mechanism. Chapter 2, highlighted the need to
revisit the definitions of self-replicating programs, e.g. viruses, worms, and
botnets, and extend them to include the defensive prospective. We have
also proposed general design guidelines for defensive worms, before briefly
addressing the fear factor that usually prevents the industry from adopting
such defensive approaches. Chapter 3 highlighted different attempts that
considered defensive worms for vulnerability mitigation, countermeasures,
or administrative tasks by pointing out researchers work in that regard.
After giving the reader an overview of defensive worms and previous
research on that topic, we proposed a novel controlled self-replicating, self-
propagating, self-contained vulnerability mitigation mechanism (i.e. defen-
sive worm) named Seawave in Chapter 4. Seawave utilizes CAM, STP, OSPF,
and ARP protocols to traverse the enterprise network. Further improve-
ments to our vulnerability mitigation worm have also been addressed in
Chapter 5, before briefly proposing another novel defensive worm that uti-
lize information retrieved by the LLDP protocol to propagate in Chapter
6.
In Chapter 7, thereafter, we have released Seawave against a malicious
random scanning worm (that mimics to some extent Slammer worm be-
havior) and evaluated its performance and observed its capabilities in de-
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fending the enterprise network against such malicious outbreak. Where in
Chapter 8 we proposed a Bayseian Belief Networks based threat model to
address different probabilistic scenarios to breach Seawave. The chapter
provides sequential attacks in the form of baysian trees and measure the
likelihood of these – scenario based – attacks taking place. The model also
addresses the possibility of using different small scale attack scenarios as
part of a major operation – launched by multiple adversaries – to compro-
mise Seawave.
Finally in Chapter 9 we proposed an analytical propagation model to
evaluate and analyze Seawave’s performance on large scale enterprise net-
works. The mechanism has been examined under different sizes of net-
works, starting form 10,000 nodes up to one million. The chapter also pro-
posed a bandwidth generation model to measure traffic generation within
different stages of Seawave propagation – excluding packets generated within
the switch.
10.2 Directions for future work
The topic of designing computer worms for defensive use can not be de-
scribed as mature, further work needs to be accomplished by the research
community to be able to tackle all the problems associated with self-replicating
and self-propagating network programs and pave the way for the industry
to adopt such approaches. Our future work shall be in that direction, specif-
ically:
10.2.1 Seawave in Industrial Standards.
Although we have run Seawave on different event-driven environments
that mimics to a large extent real world enterprise networks, deploying the
vulnerability mitigation mechanism in an actual real world network is nec-
essary to set it up for industry standards and make sure it operates within
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acceptable protective measures. Introducing the first reliable self-replicating
and self-propagating security product is important to move this topic from
research to real world networks. Further enhancements to the defensive
worm shall be introduced to make it more robust and more capable in work-
ing under different environments.
10.2.2 Further Work on LLDP Vulnerability Mitigation Defensive
Worm.
In the thesis we have introduced a vulnerability mitigation mechanism that
utilized LLDP for its propagation and we believe there is more space for
improvements, including:
• Reduce the number of redundant probes.
• Add the capability for the mechanism to traverse the backbone and
cover the whole enterprise network.
• Assess the threats towards the defensive worm.
• Provide a mathematical propagation model for evaluation in large scale
networks.
10.2.3 Wireless Defensive Worms.
We have only considered defensive worms for wired networks, however, it
is necessary to address the wireless medium as well. One possible approach
would be designing an LLDP-Based defensive worm to mitigate vulnera-
bilities in LLDP-Supported Wireless networks, where the worm propagate
depending on information retrieved from the LLDP protocol.
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10.3 Conclusion
The race between malicious intrusions and defensive mechanisms is always
close. However, threats are increasing in scale, intelligence, and sophis-
tication and unless the research community push forward new defensive
ideas and techniques, the intruders will always be in the lead. Several calls
have been issued by industries and governments for solutions that provide
prompt and effective responses to prevent (or even reduce) the damage
caused by continuous malicious attacks. Unfortunately, researchers seldom
look into worms beyond the malicious prospective; indeed that limited view
has led the research community to overlook the possible employment of
their distinctive features in network protection.
In this thesis we have revisited the definitions of worms and self replicat-
ing code – in general –, to pave the way for a straightforward identification
of viruses, worms, and botnets; and to also consider the beneficial sides of
these programs, which is often overlooked in the literature. The proposed
definitions and taxonomy of self-replicating programs are based on their
properties, while the distinction between malicious and defensive (or ben-
eficial) actions is left for the jurisdiction. This is necessary as in this topic
the ethical side is always highlighted, although the common prospective
in regard to self-replicating code is often negative – disallowing their com-
mercial use. We have also observed through the related work chapter, that
the concept of using defensive worms as a countermeasure is not new but
indeed not mature enough.
We have looked into worms free from any prejudgments and tried to
hire their capabilities to mitigate vulnerabilities in enterprise networks, by
proposing a controlled self-replicating, self-propagating, and self-contained
vulnerability mitigation worm by the name of Seawave. To the best of our
knowledge the mechanism is the first worm that utilize the second layer of
the OSI model (Data link layer) as its main propagation medium, thats be-
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cause it is meant to be deployed within enterprise networks and not on the
Internet. We found that to tackle the problem of excessive bandwidth gener-
ation – usually associated with worms – the propagation should not be viral
and should adhere to control measures, such as using topology information
as in the case of Seawave. The worm also can be monitored and supervised
by allowing agents to refer to a master entity for instructions.
Owing to the self-replicating and self-propagating properties of Seawave,
the mechanism possess the capabilities of:
• Short distance communication with vulnerable nodes.
• Intermittent nodes vulnerability detection.
• Network topology discovery.
• Intelligent Network Propagation.
• Workload distribution.
It worth mentioning that the network topology discovery feature would aid
in solving the growing problem of allocating and disinfecting malicious bot-
nets scattered around networks.
By modeling several statistical attack scenarios against our vulnerabil-
ity mitigation mechanism, weak and strong points becomes more appar-
ent. It is observed that most weaknesses do not come from Seawave it-
self, but from the topology it runs within; thats because topology depen-
dent self-replicating and self-propagating mechanisms becomes vulnerable
to the same vulnerabilities of the topologies they run within and any pro-
tective measures applied to these topologies, eventually becomes protective
measures to these mechanisms.
For topology sensitive mechanisms, such as Seawave, it is better to asses
the performance within an event-driven simulation environment using dif-
ferent – randomly generated – topologies. As in event-driven simulations
183
10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
the topology is not required to be pre-deterministic, which is closer to real
world networks; and that what we have done for small and medium scale
enterprise networks. However due to lack of resources, doing the same as-
sessment on large scale networks becomes difficult. Therefore, we have run
Seawave on large scale enterprise networks by proposing a mathematical
propagation model where we have observed different points of improve-
ments. In the model Seawave run within a pre-deterministic topology with
different sizes up to one million nodes. The propagation model takes into
consideration the internal details of the topology, since our defensive worm
is topology sensitive; and since Seawave follow the STP in its propagation,
it views the enterprise network in terms of levels and not necessary number
of nodes. The more levels the network has, the more time it takes the mech-
anism to cover the network. Furthermore, the number, structure, and size of
LANs within the enterprise network, in addition to, the position where the
mechanism is initiated does also affects the performance of the defensive
worm, including its time of coverage.
In general, we believe that self-replicating code for defensive (or bene-
ficial) purposes worth considering to become a new research direction in
academia. Seawave has been designed to assess enterprise networks secu-
rity teams in their work to mitigate vulnerabilities. Several simulations and
evaluations of the defensive worm have shown promising results in pro-
viding rapid and effective vulnerability mitigation coverage, in addition to,
controlled propagation. Which encourages exploring this field of study and
open new paths to solve modern network problems; as the common way of





A.1 Attack Scenarios Probabilities
A.1.1 Goal: Malicious Use of Agent to Master Node Communication
Scenario 1 Probability of decrypting the Agent-Master node communication line
by breaking asymmetric RSA encryption mathematically.
= P (A ∩B ∩ ¬C ∩D)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬C ∩D) · P (B ∩ ¬C ∩D)
= P (A|B) · P (B ∩ ¬C ∩D)
= P (A|B) · P (B|¬C ∩D) · P (¬C ∩D)
= P (A|B) · P (B|¬C ∩D) · P (¬C) · P (D)
= 0.1 · 0.01 · 0.7 · 0.001
= 7× 10−5%
Scenario 2 Probability of decrypting the agent to master node communication line
by breaking asymmetric encryption using brute force attack.
= P (A ∩B ∩ C ∩ ¬D)
= P (A|B ∩ C ∩ ¬D) · P (B ∩ C ∩ ¬D)
= P (A|B) · P (B ∩ C ∩ ¬D)
= P (A|B) · P (B|C ∩ ¬D) · P (C ∩ ¬D)
= P (A|B) · P (B|C ∩ ¬D) · P (C) · P (¬D)




Scenario 3 Probability of exhausting master node with agent connections by send-
ing Seawave Agent to Master packets obtained by sniffing traffic after plugging
the intruder machine to the enterprise network.
= P (G ∩H ∩ I ∩ ¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ I ∩ ¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K) · P (H ∩ I ∩ ¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H ∩ I ∩ ¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H|I) · P (I ∩ ¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H|I) · P (I|¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K) · P (¬J ∩N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H|I) · P (I|¬J ∩N) · P (¬J) · P (N) · P (¬K)
= 0.5 · 0.4 · 0.5 · 0.7 · 0.5 · 0.3
= 1.05%
Scenario 4 Probability of exhausting master node with connections based on reply-
attacks sent from a compromised node.
= P (G ∩H ∩ I ∩ J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ I ∩ J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K) · P (H ∩ I ∩ J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H ∩ I ∩ J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H|I) · P (I ∩ J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H|I) · P (I|J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K) · P (J ∩ ¬N ∩ ¬K)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬K) · P (H|I) · P (I|J ∩ ¬N) · P (J) · P (¬N) · P (¬K)
= 0.5 · 0.4 · 0.3 · 0.3 · 0.5 · 0.3
= 0.27%
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Scenario 5 Probability of exhausting master node with SYN-Flood connections.
= P (G ∩ ¬H ∩ ¬I ∩ ¬J¬N ∩K)
= P (G|¬H ∩ ¬I ∩ ¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K) · P (¬H ∩ ¬I ∩ ¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K)
= P (G|¬H ∩K) · P (¬H ∩ ¬I ∩ ¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K)
= P (G|¬H ∩K) · P (¬H|¬I ∩ ¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K) · P (¬I ∩ ¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K)
= P (G|¬H ∩K) · P (¬H|¬I) · P (¬I ∩ ¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K)
= P (G|¬H ∩K) · P (¬H|¬I) · P (¬I|¬J ∩ ¬N) · P (¬J ∩ ¬N ∩K)
= P (G|¬H ∩K) · P (¬H|¬I) · P (¬I|¬J ∩ ¬N) · P (¬J) · P (¬N) · P (K)
= 0.8 · 0.5 · 0.9 · 0.7 · 0.5 · 0.7
= 8.82%
Scenario 6 Probability of feeding malformed information to master node.
= P (L ∩M)
= P (L|M) · P (M)




A.1.2 Goal: Malicious Use of Agent to Agent Communication
Scenario 7 Probability of stopping the agent propagation by sending the agent a Se
awave SelfReplicate ACK packet by flooding the network after compromising
the mechanism’s mac algorithm.
= P (A ∩B ∩ C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F ) · P (B ∩ C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B ∩ C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B|C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F ) · P (C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B|C) · P (C ∩D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B|C) · P (C|D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F ) · P (D ∩ ¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B|C) · P (C|D) · P (D|¬E ∩ ¬F ) · P (¬E ∩ ¬F )
= P (A|B ∩ ¬E) · P (B|C) · P (C|D) · P (D) · P (¬E|¬F ) · P (¬F )
= 0.7 · 0.5 · 0.3 · 0.1 · 0.995 · 0.8
= 0.8358%
Scenario 8 Probability of stopping the agent propagation by sending an authentic
Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet after compromising the agent.
= P (A ∩ ¬B ∩ ¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ ¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F ) · P (¬B ∩ ¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ E) · P (¬B ∩ ¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ E) · P (¬B|¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F ) · P (¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ E) · P (¬B|¬C) · P (¬C ∩ ¬D ∩ E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ E) · P (¬B|¬C) · P (¬C|¬D ∩ E ∩ F ) · P (¬D ∩ E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ E) · P (¬B|¬C) · P (¬C|¬D) · P (¬D|E ∩ F ) · P (E ∩ F )
= P (A|¬B ∩ E) · P (¬B|¬C) · P (¬C|¬D) · P (¬D) · P (E|F ) · P (F )
= 0.2 · 0.7 · 0.5 · 0.9 · 0.3 · 0.2
= 0.378%
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Scenario 9 Probability of compromising the mac algorithm by brute force attack.
= P (G ∩H ∩ ¬I)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬I) · P (H ∩ ¬I)
= P (G|H ∩ ¬I) · P (H) · P (¬I)
= 0.2 · 0.2 · 0.8
= 3.2%
Scenario 10 Probability of compromising the mac algorithm by compromising the
agent.
= P (G ∩ ¬H ∩ I)
= P (G|¬H ∩ I) · P (¬H ∩ I)
= P (G|¬H ∩ I) · P (¬H) ∗ P (I)
= 0.2 · 0.8 · 0.8
= 12.8%
Scenario 11 Probability of stopping agent propagation to next LAN by compromis-
ing a host at next LAN then poisoning the ARP cache of the LAN router to point to
the compromised machine and send back a fake Seawave SelfReplicate ACK
packet to stop the agent from propagating to the target LAN.
= P (J ∩ P ∩K ∩ L)
= P (J |P ∩K ∩ L) ∗ P (P ∩K ∩ L)
= P (J |P ) · P (P ∩K ∩ L)
= P (J |P ) · P (P |K ∩ L) · P (K ∩ L)
= P (J |P ) · P (P |K) · P (K|L) · P (L)




Scenario 12 Probability of capturing the agent code by compromising a host ma-
chine and tricking the agent to choose that machine using MAC address flooding.
= P (M ∩N ∩O ∩ ¬Q)
= P (M |N ∩O ∩ ¬Q) · P (N ∩O ∩ ¬Q)
= P (M |N) · P (N |O ∩ ¬Q) · P (O ∩ ¬Q)
= P (M |N) · P (N |O ∩ ¬Q) · P (O)P (¬Q)
= P (M |N) · P (N |O) · P (O)
= 0.5 · 0.5 · 0.2 · 0.7
= 3.5%
A.1.3 Goal: Compromise Agent to Switch Communication
Scenario 13 Probability of redirecting an agent to probe a rogue host by compro-
mising a host machine and flooding the CAM table with the target mac address.
= P (A ∩B ∩ I ∩ ¬J)
= P (A|B ∩ I ∩ ¬J) · P (B ∩ I ∩ ¬J)
= P (A|B) · P (B|I ∩ ¬J) · P (I)P (¬J)
= 0.6 · 0.5 · 0.2 · 0.7
= 4.2%
Scenario 14 Probability of forming a DoS attack by manipulating STP next bridge
field.
= P (C ∩D)
= P (C|D) · P (D)
= 0.6 · 0.7
= 42%
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Scenario 15 Probability of stopping agent propagation by pointing STP next bridge
to non-existent switch and flood CAM table with non-existent MAC.
= P (E ∩ F )
= P (E|F ) · P (F )
= 0.6 · 0.7
= 42%
Scenario 16 Probability of transferring the agent to next LAN by modifying STP
next bridge to point to router.
= P (G ∩H)
= P (G|H) · P (H)
= 0.6 · 0.7
= 42%
A.1.4 Goal: Compromise Agent to Host Communication
Scenario 17 Probability of capturing exploit code used by agent to probe for vul-
nerability on a compromised host connected to the same switch.
= P (A ∩B ∩ ¬H)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬H) · P (B ∩ ¬H)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬H) · P (B) · P (¬H)




Scenario 18 Probability of stopping the agent from probing hosts connected to the
same switch for vulnerabilities by flooding hosts with Seawave Host Probe ACK
packets.
= P (C ∩D ∩ I)
= P (C|D ∩ I) · P (D ∩ I)
= P (C|D ∩ I) · P (D|I) · P (I)
= 0.5 · 0.5 · 0.3
= 7.5%
Scenario 19 Probability of stopping the agent from propagating to the next switch
by flooding hosts with Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packets
= P (E ∩ F ∩ ¬G)
= P (E|F ∩ ¬G) · P (F ∩ ¬G)
= P (E|F ∩ ¬G) · P (F |¬G) · P (¬G)
= P (E|F ∩ ¬G) · P (F ) · P (¬G)
= 0.5 · 0.5 · 0.5
= 12.5%
Scenario 20 Probability of stopping the agent from propagating to the next switch
by sending a unicast Seawave SelfReplicate ACK packet to the agent.
= P (E ∩ ¬F ∩ ¬J ∩G ∩K ∩ L)
= P (E|¬F ∩ ¬J ∩G ∩K ∩ L) · P (¬F ∩ ¬J ∩G ∩K ∩ L)
= P (E|¬F ∩G) · P (¬F |¬J ∩G ∩K ∩ L) · P (¬J ∩G ∩K ∩ L)
= P (E|¬F ∩G) · P (¬F |¬J) · P (¬J) · P (G|K) · P (K|L) · P (L)
= 0.4 · 0.5 · 0.5 · 0.5 · 0.2 · 0.5
= 0.5%
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A.1.5 Goal: Compromise Agent to Router Communication
Scenario 21 Probability of stopping the agent from propagating on the backbone by
feeding malformed Seawave LSD ARP RPL (LSD point to no further routers) after
compromising OSPF.
= P (A ∩B ∩ C ∩ ¬D ∩ ¬E)
= P (A|B ∩ C ∩ ¬D ∩ ¬E) · P (B ∩ C ∩ ¬D ∩ ¬E)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬D) · P (B|C ∩ ¬D ∩ ¬E) · P (C ∩ ¬D ∩ ¬E)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬D) · P (B|C) · P (C|¬D ∩ ¬E) · P (¬D ∩ ¬E)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬D) · P (B|C) · P (C) · P (¬D|¬E) · P (¬E)
= 0.5 · 0.4 · 0.4 · 0.5 · 0.6
= 2.4%
Scenario 22 Probability of redirecting or stopping the agent from propagating on
the backbone by feeding malformed Seawave ARP RPL (ARP Table information)
= P (A ∩ ¬B ∩ ¬C ∩D ∩ E)
= P (A|¬B ∩ ¬C ∩D ∩ E) · P (¬B ∩ ¬C ∩D ∩ E)
= P (A|¬B ∩D) · P (¬B|¬C ∩D ∩ E) · P (¬C ∩D ∩ E)
= P (A|¬B ∩D) · P (¬B|¬C) · P (¬C|D ∩ E) · P (D ∩ E)
= P (A|¬B ∩D) · P (¬B|¬C) · P (¬C) · P (D|E) · P (E)
= 0.5 · 0.6 · 0.6 · 0.5 · 0.4
= 3.6%
Scenario 23 Probability of an attacker impersonating a router.
= P (F ∩ I ∩ J)
= P (F |I ∩ J) · P (I ∩ J)
= P (F |I) · P (I| ∩ J) · P (J)




A.1.6 Goal: Unauthorized Modification of Agent Code
Scenario 24 Probability of Compromising the private key by compromising the
master node itself.
= P (A ∩B ∩ ¬C)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬C) · P (B ∩ ¬C)
= P (A|B ∩ ¬C) · P (B) · P (¬C)
= 0.5 · 0.3 · 0.9
= 13.5%
Scenario 25 Probability of revealing the private key by brute-force.
= P (A ∩ ¬B ∩ C)
= P (A|¬B ∩ C) · P (¬B ∩ C)
= P (A|¬B ∩ C) · P (¬B) · P (C)
= 0.2 · 0.7 · 0.1
= 1.4%
A.1.7 Goal: Compromising Agent in Host Machine
Scenario 26 Probability of Compromising the Agent installed in a vulnerable ma-
chine.
= P (A ∩B ∩ C)
= P (A|B ∩ C) · P (B ∩ C)
= P (A|B) · P (B ∩ C)
= P (A|B) · P (B|C) · P (C)
= 0.4 · 0.5 · 0.5
= 10%
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A.1.8 Goal: Mechanism Information Gathering
Scenario 27 Probability of a malicious user accessing enterprise network and start
sniffing agent traffic to allocate master node.
= P (A ∩B ∩ C)
= P (A|B ∩ C) · P (B ∩ C)
= P (A|B) · P (B|C) · P (C)
= 0.7 · 0.5 · 0.7
= 24.5%
A.2 Multiple Attack Scenario Probability
A.2.1 Goal: Put The Mechanism Propagation Process into Halt
Multiple Scenarios 28 Probability of a group of adversaries gathering information
about the mechanism’s traffic, while trying to block the agents from propagating
within the switch domain, in addition to disallowing the mechanism from travers-
ing the backbone, forcing the propagation into halt.
= P (S15 ∩ S21 ∩ S27)
= P (S15|S21 ∩ S27) · P (S21 ∩ S27)
= P (S15|S27) · P (S21|S27) · P (S27)
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